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ABSTRACT  
   
The three essays in this dissertation each examine how aspects of contemporary 
administrative structure within American research universities affect faculty outcomes. 
Specific aspects of administrative structure tested in this dissertation include the 
introduction of new administrative roles, administrative intensity (i.e. relative size of 
university administration), and competing roles between faculty, administrators, and 
staff. Using quantitative statistical methods these aspects of administrative structure are 
tested for their effects on academic grant productivity, faculty job stress, and faculty job 
satisfaction. Administrative datasets and large scale national surveys make up the data for 
these studies and quantitative statistical methods confirm most of the hypothesized 
relationships.  
In the first essay, findings from statistical modeling using instrumental variables 
suggest that academic researchers who receive administrative support for grant writing 
and management obtain fewer grants and have a lower success rate. However, the 
findings also suggest that the grants these researchers do receive are much larger in terms 
of dollars. The results indicate that administrative support is particularly beneficial in 
academic grant situations of high-risk, high-reward. In the second essay, ordered logit 
models reveal a statistically significant and stronger relationship between staff intensity 
(i.e., the ratio of faculty to staff workers) and faculty stress than the relationship between 
executive intensity (i.e., the ratio faculty to executive and managerial workers) and 
faculty job stress. These findings confirm theory that the work of faculty is more loosely 
coupled with the work of executives than it is with staff workers. A possible explanation 
is the increase in administrative work faculty must take on as there are fewer staff 
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workers to take on administrative tasks. And finally, in the third essay results from multi-
level modeling confirm that both role clarity and institutional support positively affect 
both a global measure of faculty job satisfaction and faculty satisfaction with how their 
work time is allocated. Understanding the effects that administrative structure has on 
faculty outcomes will aid universities as faculty administrative burdens ebb and flow in 
reaction to macro trends in higher education, such as unbundling of faculty roles, 
unbundling of services, neoliberalism, liberal arts decline, and administrative bloat. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: A FOCUS ON UNIVERSITY BUREAUCRACY 
One simple definition of bureaucracy explains it as the existence of a specialized 
administrative staff whose function is to service and maintain the organization itself 
(Scott & Davis, 2006, p. 48). Over recent years, there have been disparate complaints by 
faculty at American research universities regarding bureaucratic problems that have come 
about not because of malice or direct intent by one actor or another but because of 
pathological policies and organizational processes, bureaucratic drift, and shifts in human 
resource allocations because of changes in funding. Some faculty complain of 
insurmountable administrative burdens in academic grant management (National Science 
Board, 2014). Others complain of huge amounts of ‘shadow work’ – work shifted to them 
from others originally hired for those purposes (Flaherty, 2016a). Still others complain of 
ambiguous work roles and weak administrative power (Finkelstein, Conley, & Schuster, 
2016). Each of these complaints centers on a common subject: the working relationship 
between university faculty and non-teaching administrators and staff at universities, or 
what I call the faculty-administration exchange.    
Issues regarding the faculty-administration exchange have been overlooked, both 
in practice and in the academic literature, because of other pressing issues in higher 
education that, in many ways, rightly focus on student costs, student outcomes, and job 
obtainment (Besharov & Call, 2009; Conner & Rabovsky, 2011). However, some of the 
commonly assumed causes of these student issues – that the size of university 
bureaucracies are too large (Archibald & Feldman, 2008) and that the existing structure 
of higher education organizations as we know it are outdated and need to be innovated 
  2 
(Craig, 2015; Carey, 2015; Crow & Debars, 2015) – also affects those working in 
universities. The three essays in this dissertation aim to provide a better understanding of 
how a few aspects of contemporary university administration – specifically the 
introduction of new administrative roles, the relative size of university administration 
(i.e., administrative intensity), and the competing roles between faculty and 
administrators – affect faculty productivity and organizational behavior outcomes like job 
stress and satisfaction. The hope is that these essays will bring richness to the current 
meta-dialogue by addressing both the concerns of critics and the concerns of faculty 
members as well as add to the academic literature on university management. 
The first essay examines whether the existence of an administrative support role 
for academic grant writing and management has an effect on faculty grant productivity. 
Research administration is a relatively new role in universities that has proliferated over 
the last three decades or so. This role and others in university bureaucracies have grown, 
in part, as a result of the arms race for students and resources. In a time when state 
resources are increasingly constrained, public universities look to other sources of 
revenue such as international students, out-of-state students, Federal title IV funding, and 
competitive research grants to maintain fiscal health. To remain competitive for grants, 
universities have created this specialized work role that focuses entirely on helping 
faculty members obtain and manage grants. Universities now expect faculty to bring in 
grant money to support their research where in many fields this was once just a 
suggestion. The hope is that this change in administrative configuration from previously 
more slim or nonexistent configurations of academic grant management will pay off in 
the form of more competitive grant applications. The first essay seeks to test the efficacy 
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of this administrative role, indirectly measuring whether universities are actually getting a 
return on their investments in administration and contributing to understanding as to 
whether these roles are fulfilling their intended function.  
The second empirical essay examines whether administrative intensity (i.e., the 
ratio of faculty to administrative and staff workers) has an effect on faculty 
administrative stress levels. As previously mentioned, a common call among critics is 
that over the last few decades university bureaucracies have become too bloated (J. P. 
Greene, Kisida, & Mills, 2012). A key aspect of this issue is the functional overlap in the 
administrative job duties between faculty and staff members. As the relative size of 
university administrations grow or decline, administrative job duties necessarily fall upon 
or are taken away from faculty members. This situation can lead to ‘shadow work’ as 
faculty members must fulfill administrative tasks that require little training or expertise 
that were once the domain of workers hired to do those tasks. The third essay 
demonstrates that faculty do indeed feel higher levels of stress from administrative 
activities as the relative number of staff decreases.  
The third empirical essay tests whether clarity about the roles and authority of 
faculty and administrators affects faculty job satisfaction. Because faculty members 
teach, research, and also do service and administrative work I argue and demonstrate that 
their satisfaction levels are subject to the clarity of their role and authority as it relates to 
administrative workers. As explained in greater detail later in this introduction, critics 
have called for ‘unbundling’ of job roles of faculty members. An unbundling of faculty 
duties would result in ‘para-academics’ who would focus solely on one of teaching, 
research, service, or administration or a subset of those. This proposal is a far cry from 
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tenure-track faculty roles as they stand now, and the existing wide range of faculty duties 
also creates some tensions as to how their overall role relates to the work of staff and 
administrators. Despite the many studies that have examined the various antecedents of 
faculty job satisfaction, very few or none have examined whether role clarity and some of 
its organizational complexities, like institutional support for faculty leaders, affect faculty 
job satisfaction. This third paper seeks to fill that gap as well as speak to issues regarding 
the role of bureaucracy in universities.    
This introduction proceeds as follows: The next sections describe current 
theoretical and practical issues regarding the structure of university organizing, as well as 
a theoretical explanation as to why current administrative structures in universities will be 
slow to change and remain largely as they are for the foreseeable future. The aim of these 
sections is to set the scene in which faculty-administrative exchanges occur, which is the 
basis for all three essays. These sections are followed by explanations for how the essays 
contribute both theoretically and practically with regard to the dialogue on university 
administrative structure. The introduction ends with limitations of the studies as well as 
ideas for future research. 
THE STRUCTURE OF UNIVERSITY BUREAUCRACIES 
Size 
The size and efficiency of university bureaucracies are central aspects to an 
ongoing question facing higher education in the United States: whether the organizational 
structure that has defined universities for decades (or even centuries) will continue to 
stand the test of time. At odds are the traditional model of higher education and the need 
to appear innovative. While innovation is not inherently good nor bad, in the public arena 
  5 
innovation is seen as a positive sign of the health of public institutions (McLendon, 
Heller, & Young, 2005). Innovation means that leaders and policy makers are responsive 
to new ideas as it has been found that a state's innovativeness may influence the public 
perceptions about the responsiveness of elected officials and the quality of services 
(Berry, 1994). State innovativeness is important for the postsecondary education sector, 
where escalating college costs for students have increased criticism over the efficiency 
and productivity of higher education (McLendon et al., 2005). 
Many argue that the rise in costs in higher education is due to administrative 
bloat. On one side of the argument is the “revenue hypothesis,” the basic argument being 
that universities spend everything they get, making revenue the only constraint on 
costs (Bowen, 1980). Oppositely, the “cost disease” theory is not unique to higher 
education but refers to personal service industries of which higher education is an 
example (Baumol, 1967). The “cost disease” theory argues that in industries reliant on 
personal services of highly educated labor, such as dentistry or higher education, rising 
costs are directly related to rising salaries for highly educated labor relative to the less 
educated labor force (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). In higher education, both faculty and 
administration have traditionally been positions that require high levels of education.  
Furthermore, the personal service industries most affected by the “cost disease” are the 
ones that least benefit from advances in productivity from technology. Whereas in some 
industries like manufacturing technology makes the average worker more productive, but 
in industries such as dentistry filling a cavity requires relatively the same amount of 
highly trained labor as always (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). Like dentistry, higher 
education is an industry that has yet to find great productivity improvements from 
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technology the way manufacturing has. While it is true that technology in higher 
education has improved tremendously, at this point no serious effort to fully cost online 
programs within traditional colleges has been done, so any report on large scale quality 
increases per dollar that comparing online to face-to-face education is only speculative 
and hopeful (Means, Bakia, & Murphy, 2014, p. 170). 
 Another explanation for rising costs in higher education is the cuts in state 
funding for higher education during the Great Recession (Webber, 2016). After the great 
recession of 2007-2009, states cut higher education at the same time that enrollments 
were rising as unemployed workers went back to school (Mitchell, Leachman, & 
Masterson, 2016). Coincidentally, Arizona's students were the hardest hit seeing an 
87.8% increase in average tuition at four-year public colleges adjusted for inflation from 
2008 to 2016. Over the same time period, state spending per students dropped 55.6%. 
The steep state cuts also led to eliminations of staff positions and academic programs 
(MItchell et al., 2016). The ‘balance wheel’ model predicts that higher education funding 
will be cut more than other budget items in hard economic times and will receive larger 
increases than other budget items during good economic times (Hovey 1999). Previously 
just theoretical, the functional form of state higher education funding does follow 
Hovey’s balance wheel model (Delaney & Doyle, 2011).  
Further complicating the issue is the fact that most universities are multi-unit, 
non-profit organizations. Since non-profits are not expected to produce a profit if 
revenues exceed costs in any given unit, resources can be shifted to another unit where 
costs exceed revenues. For example, revenues from undergraduate or master’s degree 
programs can support administrator perks, the teaching of doctoral students, or even 
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sports teams (Winston, 1999), so it is hard to follow the trail of where any extra resources 
are going. The complexity of university finance, coupled with resource shifting within 
multi-unit non-profits such as large universities, does not alleviate concerns about 
administrative bloat. 
There is also a clear differentiation between colleges that rely on customer-inputs 
(i.e, students who pay tuition) and colleges that rely on donations (i.e., alumni 
contributions). Those universities with large endowments from donations can subsidize 
their product with contributions and ostensibly provide a better education, which in turn 
attracts better prepared students from wealthier families who eventually become rich 
themselves and make larger donations, creating a situation where the rich get richer. The 
elite universities that benefit from this cycle are most often private non-profits, while the 
universities that educate the masses, public universities, do not.  
The small group of Ivy League universities and elite liberal arts colleges can and 
should usually be ignored in discussions regarding higher education policy for the masses 
because their financial situation is so different from the vast majority of post-secondary 
institutions both in terms of faculty issues and student issues. However, higher education 
is a highly institutionalized field subject to strong isomorphic pressures and the elite 
universities are the model setters for all the others to follow. Thus, bloated university 
administrations may be a result of non-elite universities following the administrative 
model of elite universities even when financially the situations are quite different. This 
situation for public universities is exacerbated by cuts in state funding (Rizzo, 2004) as 
previously explored. Again, while much of the hand-wringing over administrative bloat is 
about student costs and outcomes, conspicuously missing from this dialogue is an 
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understanding of how administrative sizes affect faculty outcomes like stress levels, 
satisfaction, and productivity.   
Service and Role Bundles 
Similar to the issue of administrative size, a related problem for many universities 
is the existing structure of academic work, the structure of academic services, and the 
entire value proposition of how higher education outputs are delivered. For many, the 
catch all fix for these structural issues is “unbundling.” For some, unbundling in higher 
education refers to splitting up the traditional tripartite role of university faculty who 
teach, research, and do service (Macfarlane, 2011), while for others unbundling refers 
more to breaking apart the seemingly superfluous services and degree programs provided 
by universities (Craig, 2015).  
The morphing of faculty roles from the all-rounded faculty member to para-
academics who focus directly on specific aspects of teaching, research, or service has 
implications for the quality of student experiences and the sustainability of academic 
citizenship (Macfarlane, 2011). Forces potentially driving these changes include: 
massification of national systems, the application of technology in teaching, increasing 
specialization of academic roles to support a more centralized and performative culture 
(Macfarlance, 2011), administrators and political leaders seeking to reduce faculty power 
by eliminating tenure lines (Flaherty, 2016b), and cost cutting by hiring contingent, part-
time instructors who do not have power (Ott & Dippold, 2017). The use of part-time, 
teaching only instructors has been growing steadily in traditional research universities for 
forty years (Weissmann, 2013). And, an organizational structure filled almost entirely 
with para-academics has been in place at for-profit institutions for many years (Kinser, 
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2002) but with largely questionable results of success (Cellini, 2012; Cellini & 
Chaudhary, 2014).  
Organization wide experiments in faculty role unbundling are not limited to for-
profit colleges. For example, at Western Governors University, a non-profit organization 
and an early mover in the competency based education model, even the role of teaching 
has been further split into several separate positions. There, curriculum development, 
teaching, and assessment work are separated. Content experts can focus on their expertise 
while evaluators refine their assessment role and build efficiencies. Unlike for-profit 
universities, Western Governors University is largely considered a success compared to 
for-profits (Blow, 2014; Hembree, 2017), and thus the case for faculty role unbundling is 
far from closed.    
 The unbundling of faculty roles has cost considerations that are often overlooked. 
For example, in online education as faculty roles become more distributed the cost of 
providing instruction and instructional support also go up. (Tucker & Neely, 2010). Still, 
others argue for a model in which there are more faculty members with administrative 
appointments and less full-time administrators. Administrator-faculty would be hired 
with specific administrative and teaching roles but no expectations around conducting 
research. Such a model would make university administrations more connected to 
students (Greenwald, 2017), potentially lower costs, build institutional memory, and 
would densify campus networks since adjunct instructors’ connections to university 
networks are often quite weak (Cripps, 2014) 
In addition to unbundling faculty roles, there are also arguments against service 
bundles in universities. Wang (1975) argued that the basic structure of traditional higher 
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education violates section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which condemns agreements 
by a party to sell one product or service on the condition that a buyer also purchase a 
second product or service. According to Wang (1975), higher education ties together four 
distinct products that consumers cannot purchase separately: impartation of information 
(instruction), accreditation (assessing educational attainment), coercion (pressure placed 
on students to perform), and club membership (the social and economic advantages that 
come with alumni status). In sum, including these four services or goods together is a 
bundle that violates free trade like any other antitrust violation. 
More contemporary arguments also argue against bundled services, but rather 
than making legal arguments, critics of the current system worry about the inefficiencies 
or chunkiness of bundled services at universities (Craig, 2015). The worry is that current 
university structures only exist because of isomorphism or imitation, not the typical 
functionalism that guides for-profit organizations. Unlike in business, universities gain 
prestige based on the four R’s: rankings, research, real estate, and rah! (sports) (Craig, 
2015). All four of the R’s are easier to measure and simpler to communicate to alumni 
and other interested parties than student outcomes. The result is isomorphism as regional 
and public universities attempt to mirror prestigious universities across the four R’s. 
However, because they are not elite, these universities waste resources towards the four 
R’s rather than use resources to directly improve the quality of teaching and learning 
(Stange, Jacob, & McCall, 2017). While Craig (2015) is critical of the current university 
structure, Craig and Williams (2015) envision and suggest a new bundle for students.  
The ‘full-stack’ model vertically integrates a job placement and education into one 
organization. Thus, a fully-stacked education company might not even look like a 
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traditional university, rather it might look more like an employer, a lender, a school, and 
a recruiter all in one (Fishbein, 2014).   
In contrast, there are some who would argue for more tightly bundled educational 
programs. Stronger bundled programs help students make intentional connections 
between different disciplines and experiences. Being trained in a bundled system builds 
the ability to draw from a broad range of knowledge, skills, and frameworks as one 
tackled complex problems. Because civic and professional life’s challenges are often 
complex, only broad but bundled programs and not specific unbundled programs can 
prepare one for the unpredictability of complexity. Knowing only one discipline or one 
set of discrete technical skills will not help with these sorts of problems (Mayer, 2015). 
Another strong argument against unbundling is that it pits the uneducated early student as 
their own curriculum advisor. While employers continually seek for employees that can 
problem solve, work in teams, and communicate well the prototype of the unbundled 
education is to create technicians, not critical thinkers (Mayer, 2015).   
Alternative Structures 
Other examples of a radical alternative to the way universities are organized is 
competency based education and massive online open courses (MOOCs). Instead of 
focusing on traditional semesters and seat time, competency based education favors a 
structure that creates flexibility and allows students to progress on their own time as they 
demonstrate mastery of academic content. Strategies for competency-based education 
include online and blended learning, dual enrollment and early college in high school, 
project-based and community-based learning, and credit recovery (U.S. Department of 
Education, n.d.).  
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Massive online open courses (MOOCs) were believed to be the panacea for the 
financial sustainability of higher education and also proposed an alternative structure. 
MOOCs would provide a cheap alternative to educate the masses and alleviate poverty.  
Buy-in from elite American universities gave MOOCs a trusted name and badge of 
quality that all but ensured their success to promoters. However, research suggests that 
MOOC's may not be, at least for now, the panacea for higher education. A survey by the 
provost's office of one of the elite university adopters, the University of Pennsylvania, 
suggests that those without access to higher education in developing countries, those who 
the MOOCs were supposed to help the most, are underrepresented in the early adopters 
(Christensen et al., 2013). MOOC students were found to be mostly from developed 
countries, highly educated, young, male, employed, and with main reasons for enrolling 
in the MOOC being advancing in a current job and curiosity (Christensen et al., 2013).  
While both of these new forms have their champions within the field, as of yet neither 
has taken on more than a peripheral role in how most universities organize themselves. 
Slow Change to Bureaucratic Sizes and Structures  
In many ways, arguments over administrative size and structure at universities are 
just rehashes of an age-old argument in higher education between those who would 
maintain existing university structures and those who would promote job preparation and 
innovate university structures. When considered as a private good, college is seen as 
workforce preparation with the ultimate goal being to get students a good job. When 
considered as a public good, higher education generally entails promoting the critical 
thinking learned through the liberal arts with the ultimate goal being to prepare students 
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to be good citizens and live fuller lives, as well as to think critically as workers (Labaree, 
1997).   
In traditional higher education at least four factors maintain current organizational 
structures, these factors include: 1) strong and deeply rooted institutions, 2) internal 
organizational characteristics such as loose coupling, 3) diverse funding sources, and 4) 
adherence to external entities such as accreditation agencies, athletic conferences, ranking 
systems, or coordinating bodies and associations such as the AAU that provide 
legitimacy.  
Universities have long been identified as being highly institutionalized (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977, 357), which has been a maintenance force for university structures despite 
some outside pressures. Indeed, there is wide difference between the goals externally 
placed upon universities and their internal goals, which partly stems from academic 
leaderships’ disdain for managerial corporatism (see Winter, 2009). Much of the struggle 
over university structures actually occurs with underlying shifts in the institutional logics, 
which are slowly shifting towards corporate logics that have been creeping into 
universities through mundane innovations such as admissions management and 
managerialism (Kraatz, Ventresca, & Deng, 2010). Despite these slow shifts, 
organizational structures have remained relatively similar over the decades, or even 
centuries. 
Regarding their internal organizational structures, universities have been termed 
‘organized anarchies’ (Cohen & March, 1986) and described as ‘loosely coupled’ (see 
Weick, 1976; Weick, 1982). Weick (1976) defined loose coupling as occurring when 
elements in the organization are responsive to one another but preserve separateness and 
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identity as is the case with university departments. Loosely coupled departments, each 
with different goals and identities, create goal ambiguity when a university is observed as 
a single organization but have also allowed university structures to perpetuate by creating 
internal goal ambiguity as various actors compete within the university. 
Unlike for-profit businesses and corporations where the need for profits often 
determine innovations in structure (see Milgrom & Roberts, 1992) non-profit universities 
derive funding from various sources including government subsidy in the form of direct 
appropriations as well as indirect student grants and research support, charitable 
donations from private citizens, tuition revenue from students, and income from auxiliary 
operations, such as bookstores, food services, hospitals, and sporting programs. These 
diverse funding sources make changing structures more difficult. In a study of 115 
Federal US agencies Chun and Rainey (2005) found that agencies with higher levels of 
financial “publicness”, operationalized as the proportion of financial resources that come 
from government sources (Bozeman, 1987), have a harder time evaluating and 
prioritizing their goals. Such is also the case for non-profit universities both public and 
private. Because there is no single one funding source for universities, no single funder 
can mandate changes to organizational structure. 
Finally, much like universities obtain funding from diverse sources, universities 
also obtain legitimacy from various sources, meaning that any one stakeholder does not 
have strong influence over how universities are organized. Scott (2013) notes that 
universities are loosely coupled systems, “in part because they must relate to many 
different environments” (p. 192). For example, universities must answer to educational 
accreditation agencies, professional disciplinary associations, federal agencies, athletic 
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associations, local planning and regulatory bodies, state governments, and students, each 
clamoring for accountability. Certification or accreditation is often a prime indicator of 
legitimacy (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Ruef & Scott, 1998). An organization’s legitimacy 
is affected by the number of sovereign authorities over it and by the diversity and 
inconsistency of how they think the organization should act (Meyer & Scott, 1983, 202). 
Legitimacy is more than just a goal; like oxygen is for breathing it is as fundamental to 
social existence (Scott 2013, 72).   
Even ranking systems have not been able to alter organizational structures. 
Rather, ranking systems perpetuate existing organizational structures by providing strong 
models for isomorphism by universities that are always at the top of rankings. Only a 
small few ignore rankings and try to innovate with structure. Patterson (2001) counsels 
universities to determine the minimum amount of goal specificity to satisfy external 
demands and internal policy planning in order to preserve their fundamentally creative 
character and purpose. In 1995 the distinctive Reed College pulled itself from the US 
News and World Report rankings because it saw the magazine’s methodology as 
hopelessly flawed. Instead Reed College argues that the value of an education is the 
degree of intellectual engagement in the classroom, something that rating systems cannot 
measure (“Reed College Admission Office,” 2014). Similarly, some college presidents 
and academics push back against rating systems. Many argue that no rating system, and 
thus no explicitly measureable goal, can accurately measure what happens at a good 
university no matter how thoughtful the criteria (see Shear, 2014; Kelderman, 2014). 
Despite the disdain for ranking systems, universities are beholden to them for legitimacy 
and prestige. 
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CONTRIBUTIONS 
While changes to how universities organize may be on the horizon, if the history 
of the longevity of higher education institutions is any indication, existing structures will 
be around for the foreseeable future. In recent years, two different sets of literatures have 
shed light on contemporary university structures and management. One literature 
examines how changes in university administrative structures and management affect 
student outcomes (e.g, Rabovsky, 2014; Rutherford, 2015). Another literature examines 
the effects of administrators’ leadership styles on faculty job experiences and outcomes 
(e.g. Bateh & Heyliger, 2014; Jeevan Jyoti & Sonia Bhau, 2016). This dissertation 
bridges the gap between these two emerging literatures and examines how facets of 
university administrative structures affect outcomes of importance to the central 
workforce and lifeblood of these organizations – faculty members. 
 This dissertation contributes both theoretically and practically to the issues 
regarding the size of university administrations and university structures. The first essay 
tests whether the introduction of a new university administrative role affects productivity 
outcomes at universities, directly addressing conversations in practice regarding the 
necessity of growing university administrations. The second paper tests how 
administrative intensity affects faculty job stress, again addressing questions about the 
ideal relative size of administrations within universities. The third paper examines how 
role ambiguity and institutional support affect faculty job satisfaction which speaks to 
faculty expectations regarding both their work role and the role of the institution in 
providing them support at a time when the traditional bundle of faculty roles is 
increasingly in question. 
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 Limitations 
This dissertation is not without limitations. First and foremost, there is no 
comprehensive data that directly addresses how administrative issues affect faculty 
outcomes. As such, the only way to get at the present research questions is to use 
piecemeal data, which in this case comes from multiple surveys and administrative 
datasets. Because these data were not collected to directly address the present research 
questions there were methodological issues that may have been avoidable had the data 
been collected for the research at hand. Nevertheless, as each paper explains, efforts were 
made to address stumbling blocks. The main stumbling blocks in these essays were 
measurement issues, endogeneity issues, and common method bias.  
For example, early versions of the first essay did attempt to use longitudinal data 
to parse out the endogeneity problem inherent in the relationship between the 
administrative support role and grant outcomes, but because the data being analyzed were 
not collected for this purpose it proved untenable and thus cross-sectional data with 
instrumental variable was the cleaner approach. In the second paper, the data in use did 
not include a comprehensive set of questions about faculty stress and thus arriving at a 
factor variable based on multiple dimensions of faculty stress was not possible. This issue 
is abetted by the theoretical connection between stress from administrative 
responsibilities and administrative intensity. Furthermore, the dependent variable – stress 
from administrative responsibilities – correlates highly with control variables that 
intuitively it should correlate with, supporting the reliability of this variable. The largest 
issues in the third paper are common source and common method bias as all of the data 
for this paper came from the same set of surveys. This issue was alleviated because of the 
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theory connecting the idea of job satisfaction with entities like rule clarity and 
institutional support. That is, because the ontology of job satisfaction as an entity is 
different from the separate entities of rule clarity and institutional support, common 
source bias in these relationships is less of an issue than it would be in relating job 
satisfaction with things like intention to leave or burnout, which are much more similar to 
job satisfaction ontologically. Also, from a more pragmatic perspective, all were multi-
campus/multi-institution sources.   
Future Work 
As is clear from the limitations of the study, future work on this subject would do 
well to have data directly gathered for research questions dealing with the faculty-
administration exchange. Such data could come in various forms, whether survey or 
administrative or both. Data that is longitudinal could also address the issues of 
measurement and endogeneity that plague cross sectional studies. One benefit of this 
current research is that it tests both organizational behavior outcomes and productivity 
outcomes. Future work could link administrative issues with faculty organizational 
behavior outcomes and finally with productivity outcomes. As for productivity outcomes, 
this research only considers academic grant outcomes. Future work could look at other 
faculty productivity outcomes, such as journal articles, teaching quality, or find a way to 
measure service impact. Finally, a related study might even use aggregated organizational 
outcomes such as fiscal health or societal impact to indirectly measure the effect of 
administrative structures on the effectiveness of the university.    
Another type of future academic work could anticipate future changes to 
bureaucratic sizes and structures within universities in an attempt to understand how 
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those differences would affect faculty or other outcomes. One way to undertake such 
research would be to gather data or perform case studies on higher education 
organizations that are pushing the limits of organizational bureaucracy or faculty job 
roles. As previously mentioned, research into competency based education or massive 
online open courses may be useful. Other organizations on the fringes of higher education 
may prove to be fruitful case studies. The Minerva Schools at KGI seeks to provide elite, 
Ivy level education for a cheaper cost than the current Ivy League Schools. In their 
model, students spend each semester living abroad in a different city of the world, taking 
online classes from remote and dedicated professors with other students in their cohort. 
The idea is that students will experience the great cities of the world and will have high 
level classes that are free from the typical lecture style or classroom or the huge costs in 
capital required for a physical campus. Another potential fringe case study is peer-to-peer 
learning that puts learners and teachers on the same horizontal plane. Maker spaces are a 
peer-to-peer learning culture that changes the hierarchical structure of learning. Maker 
spaces are shared production facilities where people come together to make things in a 
self-directed and horizontal structure. The recent growth of such spaces (Lou & Peek, 
2016) indicates that some people would rather learn this way, instead of the traditional 
top-down approach that is ubiquitous at the traditional university. All of these cases – 
competency based, MOOC, Minerva and maker spaces – come with radically different 
organizational structures that could have profound effects on the way both frontline and 
bureaucratic workers in higher education view themselves.    
For now, each essay in this three essay dissertation examines a research question 
that follows a uniform outline around a common theme in mainstream higher education: 
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the relationship between an aspect of university administration and a faculty outcome. 
The three empirical chapters provide an assessment of current literature and provide 
avenues for moving research in university management and policy forward. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ESSAY 1: THE EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT ON ACADEMIC 
GRANT OUTCOMES 
Over the last few decades academic researchers have been increasingly 
incentivized to spend less time on actual research and more time on related administrative 
activities. In order to be awarded the same number of grants as in past decades, academic 
researchers must now send out more grant applications, spending almost half of their time 
preparing grant proposals and managing the administrative back end of the grants they do 
receive (Rockwell, 2009; National Science Board, 2014; Barham et. al, 2014). The focus 
of this paper is the organizational response to this situation. That is, to deal with this 
problem, universities have used precious resources for the deployment of an 
organizational position whose function it is to support academic researchers through the 
grant application and management process. The ostensible hope of university leaders is 
that providing administrative support will reduce researchers’ administrative loads and 
improve their chances of obtaining grants. While this is the hope, to this point no 
systematic research has studied if administrative support actually improves grant 
outcomes. This study uses a large national survey of academic researchers to test the 
effect of administrative support on grant outcomes. 
 Findings from statistical modeling suggest that academic researchers who receive 
administrative support for grant writing and management obtain fewer grants and have a 
lower success rate. However, the findings also suggest that academic researchers who 
receive administrative support are awarded much larger grants in terms of total dollars. 
Despite attempts to work through an endogeneity issue using instrumental variables, the 
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statistical modeling approach combined with contemporary knowledge of academic grant 
management does not allow for strong causal distinctions based on these findings. 
However, the findings do suggest that administrative support exists in academic grant 
situations of high-risk, high-reward. That administrative support is an indicator of high-
risk, high-reward grants is useful knowledge for universities that are attempting to 
improve their grant management and grant obtainment.  
These results are idiosyncratic to academic grants in university settings, and so 
specific insights into grant or contract seeking behavior for other types of organizations 
are less clear. Nevertheless, the idea that administrative support correlates highly with 
grant outcomes in academia is an indication that research in other settings could prove 
fruitful. Thus, similar research on local governments (Congressional Budget Office, 
2013) or non-profits (Pettijohn, 2013) could indicate when and how administrative 
support improves grant outcomes across those different situations. In a time when 
resources are increasingly hard to come by, achieving that strategic edge may be the 
difference between obtaining the money that will lead to solvency or severe fiscal 
pressure.   
 In the pages that follow I frame and motivate the study by first expanding on the 
situation of administrative burden in academic grant management and discussing the 
general organizational responses to improving chances of receiving competitive grants. I 
follow with a review of literature on antecedents to academic grant outcomes. Since no 
other research has examined the effect of administrative support on grant outcomes, I 
look to the role that administrative support has had on outcomes in other contexts to 
support hypotheses about the role of administrative support on grant outcomes. The paper 
  23 
continues with a description of the data and analytical approach and ends with a 
discussion of the weaknesses, findings, and potential for further research. 
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
This paper examines the correlation of two concepts: administrative support for 
academic grants and academic grant outcomes. Three macro trends over the previous few 
decades motivate the study of this connection. These trends are: 1) increasing 
administrative burdens for federally funded research, 2) decreases in time spent on 
research and increases in time spent on research administration among academic 
researchers, and 3) an increasingly resource constrained environment in higher education. 
Various forces at play have led to these administrative burdens including: accountability 
with grant money, safety of research procedures, transparency with research processes 
and spending, rules that often drift into the realm of red tape, and increasing competition 
in a zero-sum game for a fixed number of grant dollars.   
Administrative Burdens for Federally Funded Research 
Over the last two decades there has been an increasing recognition that the 
administrative workload on federally funded research is out of proportion with the need 
to ensure accountability, transparency, and safety (National Science Board, 2014).  The 
National Science Board (2014) report surveyed principal investigators and administrators 
from universities in the US about administrative burdens of federally funded research. 
Respondents to the survey suggested a ‘culture of overregulation’ associated with a 
perceived increase in audit risk and concerns about liability. The report also found that a 
combination of increased compliance costs, insufficient reimbursement costs, and a 
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resulting decline in institutional administrative support at some universities, has squeezed 
out scholars’ time allocated to actual research. 
Evidence from other studies support the trend. Beginning in 1999, a National 
Institute of Health study reported that its system of regulation in some areas was 
particularly burdensome (Mahoney, 1999; see also Wadman, 1999). A report by the 
National Research Council (National Research Council, 2012), as one of its ten actions 
vital to US prosperity and security, recommended reducing or eliminating regulations that 
increase administrative costs without improving the research environment.   
Perhaps the most telling aspect of the National Science Board (2014) survey 
relates to the principal investigators who responded to the survey and their perceptions of 
the level, quality, and necessity of administrative support from their university on many 
aspects of federally funded research. The largest aspect for which PI’s suggested they 
received no help or the help was poor was “administrative support for financing” (p. 64). 
But other aspects such as “proposals,” “progress reports,” “finances,” “personnel,” and 
“data sharing” all also had at least 25% of respondents report that their university help 
was poor or non-existent.  
Research Time Allocations 
 A 2005 survey by the Federal Demonstration Partnership found that principal 
investigators of federally sponsored research spent, on average, 42% of their research 
time on administrative tasks associated with the funding (Rockwell, 2009). Barham and 
colleagues (2014) analyzed four surveys of randomly sampled faculty in agriculture and 
life sciences from 1,862 land grant universities over the years 1979, 1989, 1995 and 
2005. From 1975 to 2005 faculty time spent on research declined from 59% of time spent 
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to 47% of time spent, while time spent on administrative activities doubled from about 
5% to 10%, time spent on extension appointments went up from 5% to 13%, and time 
spent on teaching remained nearly constant at about 30%. These averages suggest that 
administrative and extension activities were cutting into research time. Within research 
time allocations, more specific data between the 1995 and 2005 surveys reveal more to 
the story. Within research time allocations between 1995 and 2005, grant preparation 
time went from up 14% to 21% of research time, administration went up from 14% to 
21%, and time spent actually doing research dropped from 72% to 58%.  
In response to the ever increasing administrative burdens and reduction in actual 
research time the federal government, along with other organizations, took efforts to 
address the concern. Congress held hearings and requested the Government 
Accountability Office conduct reviews of the regulations (Brooks, 2012). The Obama 
administration issued two Executive Orders aimed at reducing regulatory burden (The 
White House, 2011; 2012), and the Office of Management and Budget completed reforms 
to the administration of Federal research grant contracts (Office of Management and 
Budget, 2011). Despite the changes, another survey by the Federal Demonstration 
partnership in 2012 again found that principal investigators of federally sponsored 
research spent, on average 42%, of their time on associated administrative tasks 
(Schneider, Ness, Rockwell, Shaver, & Brutkiewicz, 2012).   
Resource Environment in Higher Education 
The third trend affecting scientists’ administrative burdens and hindering their 
ability to do science is the increasingly resource constrained environment in higher 
education. Between 2003 and 2012, all state sources as a percentage of total university 
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revenues dropped from 32% to 23% (Emrey-Arras, 2014), a trend that had been going on 
for a few decades before that. The balance wheel model predicts that higher education 
funding will be cut more than other budget items in hard economic times and will receive 
larger increases than other budget items during good economic times (Hovey 1999).  
Previously just theoretical, the functional form of state higher education funding does 
follow Hovey’s balance wheel model (Delaney & Doyle, 2011). True to what the balance 
wheel model would predict, the already downward trend in state funding for higher 
education was exacerbated by the Great Recession of 2007-2009. States cut support to 
higher education at the same time that enrollments were going back up as unemployed 
workers went back to school (Webber, 2016; Mitchell, Leachman, & Masterson, 2016). 
These cuts meant that public universities were forced to cut corners and find resources 
from other sources, including increasing tuition rates, increasing the number of out-of-
state and international students who pay higher tuition, federal student grant money, and 
federal grants for research.   
The Result 
As a result of the three trends, the competitive environment for academic grants is 
increasing and academic scientists must send more grant applications to get the same 
amount of grant money. As illustrated in Figure 1, principal investigators in 2001-03 
seeking funding from the National Science Foundation submitted two grant proposals 
before receiving one award. The rate jumped to 2.4 proposals per award by 2013-15.  
This problem is similar to the red queen's race theory in evolutionary biology, which 
argues that organisms must constantly adapt and evolve not just to gain advantages in 
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reproduction but to survive in an ecosystem where competitors are constantly evolving in 
an ever-changing environment (Van Valen, 1973). 
Figure 1: Number of Proposals per PI before One Award 
 
Source: National Science Foundation. Reports to the National Science Board on the 
National Science Foundation's Merit Review Process, Fiscal Years 2013 & 2015 
 
 
 How individuals and organizations respond to an increasingly competitive and 
resource constrained environment is an important question. To remain competitive for 
federal grant money, universities have responded to the increases in competition by 
employing a variety of strategies including seed funding programs, targeted talent 
searches, and creating administrative and organizational support programs to aid 
researchers through the grant application and management process (the focus of this 
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LITERATURE 
 Predictions of grant success have been separated according to characteristics the 
applicant and his or her organization, and any interaction between a cross set of those 
characteristics. For example, an applicant with high levels of existing resources from a 
specific university with a history of scholarly productivity sends a strong signal to grant 
makers that the applicant can follow through with the promise of a grant. For the risk 
intolerant grant maker this very well may be the most important signal that the applicant 
will make good use of the grant. As Figure 2 illustrates, characteristics of grant applicants 
can be distinguished between personal characteristics and the characteristics of the 
organization for which they are a stakeholder. Personal characteristics that have been 
found to correlate with grant outcomes include socio-demographics such as gender 
(Corley, Bozeman, & Gaughan, 2003) and behaviors such as research productivity (Lee 
& Bozeman, 2005). Organizational determinants of grant outcomes can be differentiated 
according to whether the determinant is a part of the rational or natural system of the 
organization. Scott and Davis (2006) distinguish between these two interactive systems, 
whereas the rational system refers to the formal structure of the organization, the natural 
system refers more to the social structure that emerges organically as a result of human 
beings being brought together. Both rational and natural systems have effects on 
academic scientists’ ability to apply for and obtain grants. As an example of rational 
systems, Gaughan and Ponomariov (2008) determined that affiliation with 
multidisciplinary research centers has a negative effect on grant outcomes, as traditional 
disciplines convey to funders a more clear research program. Haller and Welch (2014) 
focused on the natural system and found that strong professional social ties are related to 
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more grant applications and that being connected to a small network of capable 
collaborators leads to more grant successes.   
Figure 2: Characteristics of Grant Applicants 
 
 
Across many studies of grant behavior is the acknowledgement of the central role 
that collaboration plays in determining grant outcomes. Indeed, Lee and Bozeman (2005),  
Corley and colleagues (2003), Gaughan and Ponomariov (2008) and Haller and Welch 
(2014) all point to collaboration as integral to the grant application process - such 
alignment hints at the important role that joint effort plays in shouldering the 
administrative burden of academic grant administration. For example, strong ties 
positively relate to submissions, and smaller networks of strong, highly capable 
collaborators generally receive more awards (Haller and Welch, 2014). 
While it can be argued that grant collaboration is a part of both the rational and 
natural organizational systems, in most cases, collaboration among academic scientists is 
largely a result of natural systems within universities as well as open systems of academic 
networks across universities (Scott and Davis, 2006). Despite the large body of evidence 
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of the central role of collaboration in grant activity, no academic research has studied the 
role of administrative support in improving grant applications despite that fact that even 
more than seeking collaborations, academic scientists seek help from administrative 
support solely for the reason of easing the administrative burden associated with grants. 
And unlike collaborations, administrative support staff is a formal job role in universities. 
Though organic relationships within the natural structure undoubtedly influence the 
quality of help that administrative staff provide to grant applicants, administrative support 
is largely a part of the rational system. Furthermore, the specialized expertise of a staff 
grant managers creates a competitive advantage for researchers who expertise is in the 
content of grant applications, not the application process itself. In sum, scientists look to 
natural and open systems for collaborations as well as rational systems for administrative 
support for easing administrative burden associated with grants. To contribute to the 
literature, this paper focuses on the rational system and the role that administrative 
support plays in determining grant outcomes.   
HYPOTHESES 
Some research has studied the effects of administrative or personnel support on 
grant applicants but such studies examine the effects of personnel support on researchers’ 
motivations, not their grant outcomes. For example, personnel support for preparing grant 
proposals has been found to be a motivator for grant activity (Boyer & Cockriel, 1997; 
Boyer and Cockriel, 2001; Bryan, 2010). Other studies have looked at the role of training 
programs in grant writing, which is predictor of the total dollar amount of grant dollars in 
addition to being correlated with research team size, number of proposals, and conference 
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attendance (Cole, 2006). Other recent work has looked at the bureaucratization of 
academic research policies using the perspective of red tape theory (Bozeman, 2015). 
  While there has been little work on the effect of administrative support on faculty 
grant outcomes there is a small but burgeoning stream of literature on administrative 
burden as it relates to an individual’s ability to obtain benefits from public service 
organizations in other sectors, e.g., people seeking Medicaid benefits or students seeking 
grant aid benefits. This research stream relates to the situation of academic grant seeking 
because in both situations there are outsiders to an organization (e.g., citizens, academic 
researchers) applying for benefits from a public organization (e.g., Medicaid, NSF 
Grants). Most administrative burden studies examine the burden experienced by 
applicants by noting changes in program administration, changes in the number of 
administrators, changes in the application process, or changes in the number of document 
requests (Herd et al., 2013; Moynihan et al., 2015; Heinrich, 2015), but none of them 
examine how administrative support reduces administrative burdens experienced by 
benefit applicants. 
Another related stream of research focuses on the organizational red tape that 
hinders employees’ and clients’ ability to navigate the formalized rules of an organization 
in order do their job or get what they need from the organization. Perhaps the closest 
academic overlap between red tape and the situation of academic grant seeking is 
Bozeman’s (1993) concept of ‘ordinary red tape,’ which was one of four early 
conceptualizations of red tape. ‘Ordinary red tape’ is defined as rules that originate within 
an organization but that had their effect externally on stakeholders like citizens or clients. 
Despite this early conceptualization virtually all research on red tape focused on its 
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effects on internal employees, and little work has examined how internal organizational 
rules affect an organization’s clients. 
Despite there being no direct research on the effect of administrative support on 
grant outcomes in academic settings, evidence from other settings provides some insight 
on the effect of administrative support on other outcomes. Bettinger and colleagues’ 
(2012) field experiment examined administrative burden by testing the role of application 
assistance in improving FAFSA (Free Application for Federal Student Aid) submissions, 
college access, and persistence and found that immediately and later in time application 
assistance did indeed improve outcomes. Similarly, Sendhil and Eldar’s (2009) 
experiment on unbanked individuals found that workshop attendees who were given 
application assistance on the spot were 10% more likely to enroll in banking services than 
those who were provided a referral letter and instructions to open up a bank account. 
While the subjects of these studies were prospective college students and unbanked 
individuals, the general insight is useful for the case of this study – academic grant 
seeking. Providing specialized assistance for an individual as they navigate a seemingly 
complex application process yields better quality applications, which in turn may lead to 
better outcomes related to that application.  
Academic scientists can still struggle with the administrative burdens of grant 
applications despite being highly educated. Even if education plays a role in affecting 
one’s ability to complete an application in other settings, being highly educated does not 
make one immune to application difficulties if the nuances and craft required for a 
successful application are not known by the applicant. It is true that grant behavior is 
slightly different from access to benefits / entitlements in the sense that it is no longer just 
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a question of eligibility but is now a zero-sum game. But, competition only introduces 
more competitive behaviors making application craft even more necessary. In the case of 
academic grant seeking, the general hypothesis is that access to administrative support 
will make applicants more competitive by improving application quantity and / or 
quality. Not only will administrative assistance have a positive functional effect for the 
applicant, the job training and experience gained by those whose job it is to provide 
assistance will improve applications for individual applicants unfamiliar with the process. 
As this study examines multiple measures of grant activity, the main idea is that this 
general hypothesis holds for different measures of grant outcomes, as reflected in 
hypotheses 1-5. 
 
H1: Academic scientists who receive administrative support will have a higher 
number of grant proposals. 
H2: Academic scientists who receive administrative support will have a higher 
number of grant awards. 
H3: Academic scientists who receive administrative support will have a higher 
grant success rate. 
H4: Academic scientists who receive administrative support will have higher total 
grant dollars. 
H5: Academic scientists who receive administrative support will have a higher 
largest individual grant in dollars. 
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DATA 
Data for this research comes from The Netwise I survey that was deployed in the 
2006-07 school year. The survey asked about collaboration and advice networks, research 
activities, including grant submissions and success rates, teaching and service 
responsibilities, attitudes and involvement in interdisciplinary research, work 
environment, job satisfaction, job stress, and detailed demographic and academic 
background questions.  
The survey was implemented and completed online using Sawtooth Software®.  
The survey population was invited via traditional mail and a series of personalized 
follow-up emails. Each invitation provided individually assigned user-ids and passwords 
and direction to the online survey. Overall, the survey took between 30-45 minutes to 
complete. The population was constructed by manual retrieval of information from 
department and university directories from 151 universities in the U.S. that were 
designated as “Research Extensive” universities under the 2005 Carnegie Classification 
system. The disciplines (biological sciences, chemistry, computer science, earth and 
atmospheric sciences, electrical engineering, and physics) were selected based on the 
level of female representation (low, transitioning, and high fields). 
From the population of universities, 3667 faculty were selected and 1774 
completed surveys. Of the completed surveys, 176 were removed because of ineligible 
rank or discipline. Also, 21 partially completed surveys were deemed to have sufficient 
information to be included (over 95 % of questions answered). These changes led to a 
final analysis sample size of 1598 surveys, and thus the overall survey response rate 
using the RR2 method of the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
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(AAPOR) was 45.8% and the weighted response rate was 43.0%. The final analysis 
subset for this research, after observations with missing values were deleted, consists of 
1127 academic scientists (for more information on survey administration, see Jha & 
Welch, 2010). 
The majority of respondents were white (78%), male (54%), and full professors 
(44%). Academic discipline was fairly evenly spread across biologists, chemists, earth 
and atmospheric scientists, computer scientists, electrical engineers, and physicists. 
About a third of respondents received administrative support (31%) and about a quarter 
asked for administrative support (25%). Over the two years previous to the survey, the 
average number of grant applications was 5.11, average number of grant awards was 
2.27, the average grant success rate was 43%, the average total dollar amount in grants 
was about $1.9 million, and the largest grant was about $1.4 million. Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics for all of the variables in the analysis.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Administrative Support and Grant Outcomes 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Grant Submissions 7.73 11.34 0 200 
Total Grant Success Rate 0.42 0.31 0 1 
Total Grant Awards 3.38 6.84 0 164 
Total Grants (in $) $1,867,196 $7,431,032 $0 $154,000,000 
Largest Grant (in $) $1,441,987 $7,323,405 $0 $198,000,000 
Received Support 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Asked for Support 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Department Reputation 2.65 0.76 1 4 
Administrative Stress 2.18 0.86 1 4 
# Courses Taught 3.42 1.12 1 6 
# Committees 5.65 2.10 2 12 
Five Year Publication Ave. 3.76 5.36 0 100 
Assistant Professor  0.27 0.44 0 1 
Associate Professor 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Full Professor 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Female 0.46 0.50 0 1 
1st Grant Probability 17.60 14.91 0 95 
# Doc Students on Grants 0.60 1.14 0 12 
Biology 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Chemistry 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Computer Science 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Earth and Atmospheric Sciences 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Electrical Engineering 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Physics 0.17 0.38 0 1 
South or Southeast Asian 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Other Asian / Pacific Islander 0.09 0.29 0 1 
African American 0.01 0.11 0 1 
Hispanic 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Native American 0.00 0.07 0 1 
White 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Other Race / Ethnicity 0.02 0.13 0 1 
 
Measures 
Dependent variables: Survey respondents were asked to report various counts of 
their academic activity over the previous two academic years. Of particular interest as 
main dependent variables in this study are the sum of their total PI and Co-PI grant 
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submission, sum of PI and Co-PI grant awards, and the total dollar amount of grants 
received and total dollar amount of their largest grant. Grant success rates were calculated 
as grant awards divided by grant submissions.  
Main focal variable and instrumental variables: Survey respondents were 
asked the following questions: “In the past two academic years: 1) Which of these have 
you requested from your department / unit? And 2) Of these, which have you received 
from your department / unit?” which was followed by a list of resources. Among this list 
was “administrative support for grant writing and grant management.”   
Department reputation is measured using self-reports to the following survey 
question: “At this point in your career, how satisfied are you with the following?”, to 
which respondents had the option of responding on a four point (dissatisfied – satisfied) 
scale for “The reputation of your academic department.” While there may be better 
measures of university reputation, self-reports of department reputation are arguably the 
best measure because reputation is subjective. 
Control variables: To measure various aspects of work stress, respondents were 
asked the following question in the phase one survey: “To what extent are the following 
factors currently a source of stress in your work?” Among the factors to assess were 
‘administrative responsibilities,’ ‘relationships with colleagues,’ ‘publishing demands,’ 
teaching responsibilities,’ ‘time allocation between work and family,’ and ‘demands for 
obtaining external research funding,’ to which respondents could respond with 
‘Substantial,’ ‘Moderate,’ ‘Minimum,’ and ‘None.’ Taken all together, these measures 
have a Chronbach’s Alpha of .61 indicating moderate scale reliability of overall work 
stress. Exploratory factor analysis of the entire battery further confirms the weakness of 
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overall job stress as a function of the entire battery. For the current research, only the 
measure for job stress from administrative responsibilities is included in the study.  
Variables for gender and race/ethnicity are measured using dummy variables. A 
measure for grants probability is the respondent’s estimation of the probability that a first 
time submission of a federal grant will be funding. Counts measure the number of 
university and department committees on which faculty currently serve. Academic rank is 
measured with dummy variable indicating whether the faculty was an assistant professor, 
associate professor, or full professor. Other academic activity counts include the number 
of publications and the number of courses taught (previous one year).  
ANALYSIS 
 While the hypothesized relationships in this study are uniformly straightforward – 
that receiving administrative support improves grant outcomes – analysis of those 
relationships presents some challenges. The first challenge is the issue of selection for 
those who receive administrative support. It is obvious that some of the same predictors 
of grant success also predict who may and may not receive administrative support for 
grant writing and management. Many of these variables are included in the analysis as 
control variables but more is needed to further separate this endogeneity problem.  
 Instrumental variables further address the selection issue. Theoretically, the 
instrumental variables need to predict the reception of administrative support and only 
connect to grant outcomes through the reception of administrative support. Two variables 
that theoretically could affect grant outcomes, but only through the reception of 
administrative support, include asking for administrative support and department 
reputation. Asking for administrative support strongly predicts the reception of 
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administrative support and only connects to grant outcomes if the requestor actually 
receives support. That is, there is not a strong argument to be made that asking for 
administrative support on its own strongly predicts grant outcomes on its own.  
Similarly, department reputation affects whether one will receive administrative 
support because those departments with better reputations will also more likely have the 
resources to provide administrative support in the form of grant writing and management.  
Furthermore, department reputation on its own should not affect grant outcomes, 
especially if grant applications are blinded. While it is true that not all federal grant 
applications are blind, a stronger predictor of grant outcomes in a non-blind application 
process than department reputation is institutional reputation. While department and 
institutional reputation are correlated, institutional reputation is more widely known and 
less idiosyncratic than department reputation meaning that it has a stronger effect on non-
blind processes are affected by reputation. In other words, the difference between an 
individual researchers and grant authorities’ understanding of their department’s 
reputation is larger than the difference in understanding of institutional reputation. This 
difference is what makes department reputation a good candidate as an instrumental 
variable in this study. 
Figure 3, illustrates the proposed connections in this paper. The reception of 
administrative support (as predicted by the instrumental variables) will be the main 
predictor for each of the five dependent variables, along with control variables. Such a 
system of equations that predict various forms of grant outcomes suggests the use of 
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) or three stage least squares (3sls) approaches to 
account for the potential correlated errors terms across equations. However, because the 
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instrumental variables and right hand side variables are identical across all of the 
equations in this system, estimates from 3sls would reduce down to SUR, which in turn 
reduces down to the estimates that result from an equation-by-equation approach 
(Greene, 2011, pp. 343; Hayashi, 2000, pp. 283-286). The main assumption here is that 
all of the regressors are predetermined, which is the case in this instance. Thus, an 
equation-by-equation approach is the simplest approach that also yields efficient 
estimates.  




 The modelling process began with predicted values of administrative support 
using logistic regression with both instrumental variables as predictors (see Appendix A, 
Table A1, Model 1). These predicted values were then included in second stage models. 
Because the dependent variables each had a different forms (i.e., count variables, 
percentages, dollar amounts), different second stage models that best fit each were used.  
Figure 4 illustrates the basics of the two-stage process for each model.  
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Figure 4: Illustration of Two-Stage Process of Modelling 
 
 
The models predicting grant awards, grant submissions, and total grant dollars 
used negative binomial regressions because the distributions for these variables were 
count data. Likelihood ratios tests revealed negative binomial models as better fits than 
both Poisson, and zero-inflated negative binomial or zero inflated Poisson models. The 
model predicting grant success rates used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Finally, the prediction of the largest grant used 
a zero inflated negative binomial model. Negative binomial models were preferred over 
Poisson models because all of the dependent variables were over-dispersed (i.e., 
conditional variance exceeded conditional means). Likelihood ratio tests also revealed 
that the zero-inflation model was a better fit to the data for the largest grant award. Some 
outliers appeared to be present in the data. Sensitivity analysis revealed that none 
materially affected results and so they were left unaltered in the data. Finally, post-
estimation tests revealed low levels of multi-collinearity. Appendix A presents results of 
post-estimation and sensitivity tests.  
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Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the analyses. Hypotheses 4 and 5 were supported, 
while hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 were all rejected. The reception of administrative support 
did not have a statistically significant effect on grant submissions (H1) but had a 
statistically significant negative effect (p<.05) on grant awards (H2) and grant success 
rate (H3). Those who received administrative support had a 6% lower success rate and 
received 21% fewer grant awards. The reception of administrative support did have a 
statistically significant positive effect (p<.01) on total grant dollars and largest grant 
dollars. Those who received administrative support received on average, $620 thousand 
dollars more in total and their largest grant was $1.07 million larger than those who did 
not receive support. 
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Table 2: Modeling Results, Administrative Support and Grant Outcomes 
 Submissions Awards Success Rate Total $ Largest  $  
VARIABLES M2 (NB) M3 (NB) M4 (OLS) M5 (NB) M6 (ZINB) 
      
Received Admin. Sup. -0.03 -0.21** -0.06** 0.62*** 1.07*** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.14) 
Administrative Stress -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.05 0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06) 
# Courses Taught 0.02 0.04 -0.02* -0.19*** -0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
# Committees 0.06*** 0.03** -0.01*** -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
5-yr Pub. Avg 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.001) 
Assoc. Prof. -0.14** 0.13 0.08*** 0.48*** 0.20 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.02) (0.13) (0.14) 
Full Prof.  -0.20*** 0.30*** 0.14*** 0.99*** 0.84*** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.12) (0.13) 
University Reputation 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07) 
Female -0.14*** -0.09 0.00 -0.15* 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.09) (0.09) 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd -0.01*** 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.02*** 0.14*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) 
Chemistry 0.02 -0.38*** -0.08*** -0.18 -0.38** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.03) (0.15) (0.158) 
Computer Science 0.11 -0.08 -0.03 0.00 -0.43*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.03) (0.16) (0.17) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.34*** 0.39*** 0.04 0.04 -0.37** 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.03) (0.15) (0.16) 
Electrical Engineering 0.03 -0.17 0.00 0.09 -0.39** 
 (0.09) (0.12) (0.03) (0.17) (0.18) 
Physics -0.09 -0.16 0.03 0.29** -0.11 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.03) (0.15) (0.16) 
South Asian 0.16 0.16 -0.00 0.20 0.17 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.04) (0.19) (0.21) 
Other Asian 0.29*** -0.05 -0.11*** -0.59*** -0.49*** 
 (0.08) (0.11) (0.02) (0.17) (0.18) 
African American 0.18 0.15 -0.04 0.46 0.00 
 (0.22) (0.29) (0.06) (0.40) (0.44) 
Hispanic 0.29** 0.27 0.06 -0.11 -0.12 
 (0.15) (0.18) (0.05) (0.26) (0.27) 
Native American -0.13 0.23 -0.02 0.99* 2.89*** 
 (0.33) (0.42) (0.04) (0.56) (0.52) 
Race Other -0.01 0.02 -0.09 2.47*** -0.38 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.07) (0.31) (0.39) 
Constant 1.56*** 0.20 0.33*** -0.24 -0.18 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.05) (0.28) (0.29) 
Observations 1,417 1,218 1,172 1,275 1,136 
R-squared   0.19   
Zero Inflation Predictor      
Grant Awards     -0.00 
     (1.71) 
Constant     -25.51 
     (13.42) 
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; $ in millions.  Biology is the base discipline and 
white is the base race/ethnicity. NB = Negative Binomial, OLS = Ordinary Least 
Squares, ZINB = Zero Inflated Negative Binomial. Number of grant awards used to 
predict zero values in largest grant in dollars.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 The statistical results reveal that those who get administrative support get larger 
grants in terms of dollar amounts but also get fewer grant awards and have a lower 
success rate. Despite efforts to account for and correct the endogeneity between 
administrative support and grant outcomes, the data and analytical issues inherent to this 
question do not inspire enough confidence to make causal claims about administrative 
support and its effect on grant outcomes based on these data. One interpretation of these 
results is that administrative support might be more prevalent in high-risk, high-reward 
grant situations. That is, faculty who apply for large opportunities that are highly 
competitive are more inclined to draw from specialized professional assistance than their 
colleagues seeking smaller levels of external funding.    
 The findings present an interesting and useful description of the state of 
administrative support and grant outcomes at American research universities. The results 
of the analysis describe the commonly known situation in which large research labs that 
get larger grants have access to administrative support to help develop proposals and 
manage awards. A certain portion of large grant budgets is money set aside for overhead 
of which administrative support is a significant part. The data also describe a potential 
situation in which those who have administrative support win fewer numbers of grants 
and have a lower success rate. Larger grants also partially explain why these particular 
scientists receive fewer total grants as each grant goes much further in funding projects, 
labs, doctoral students, and post-docs. Perhaps the most interesting part of these results is 
the lower success rate of those who receive large grants and have administrative support. 
This low success rate speaks to the competitive environment in academic grants that is 
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probably being exacerbated by the problems outlined at the outset of this paper: that the 
administrative workload on federally funded research is out of proportion with the need 
to ensure accountability, transparency, and safety (National Science Board, 2014), that 
academic researchers’ time spent on research administration between 1975-2005 doubled 
(Barham et. al, 2014), and that the resource environment in academic science and higher 
education is becoming increasingly constrained (Emrey-Arras, 2014).  
Other approaches might provide marginal improvement at answering the research 
question at hand, such as field experiments or, in the case that experiments prove too 
costly or infeasible, propensity score matching might better account for variables that 
affect the outcome variables. Other types of models might also provide alternative fits to 
the data in these analyses but would also bring with them other challenges. These include 
two-stage residual inclusion models that may better specify the count data. Or, as 
previously mentioned, seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) or three stage least squares 
(3sls) might better fit account for the error in a parallel system of equations in which each 
model’s regressors or instruments are unique. Finally, other instrumental variables might 
better account for the endogeneity problem.  
A central outcome of administrative burdens as they relate to grant outcomes is 
the role it plays in maintaining existing power and resource structures. For many 
academic scientists grants are the main source of resources to support their scholarship. 
The problem is that if administrative burden is one of the larger hurdles for obtaining a 
grant, then the most resourced scientists are the most equipped to get more grants. Such a 
system is safer and less risky by promoting status quo but may be leaving good ideas off 
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of the table if scientists with innovative ideas cannot overcome administrative hurdles to 
getting their work funded.    
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CHAPTER 3 
ESSAY 2: ADMINISTRATIVE INTENSITY AND JOB STRESS AMONG FACULTY 
AT AMERICAN RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 
Put broadly, this is a study of how strategic choices about the size of the 
bureaucratic component within organizations affect front-line workers. More specifically, 
this paper examines how administrative intensity (i.e., the ratio of the number of frontline 
workers to the number of back-end workers) affects the job stress of faculty members at 
American research universities. The relationship between administrative intensity and the 
job stress of frontline workers is relevant to university faculty because of recent 
complaints of and efforts to reduce  “shadow work” – or administrative tasks that require 
little expertise that would have previously been performed by a non-faculty staff member 
paid to do them (Flaherty, 2016a). Shadow work arises in universities because faculty 
members at once work on the frontline as direct producers of teaching and research 
outputs while simultaneously working on back-end job functions by sharing 
administrative responsibilities with staff. This overlap in job duties make faculty stress 
levels particularly susceptible to changes in the number of available back-end staff to 
shoulder administrative workloads and shadow work.  
In this paper, evidence from empirical testing suggests that faculty experience 
more stress as the number of faculty increases relative to the number of staff workers but 
is inconclusive with regard to how faculty stress is affected by the relative number of 
executive workers. Statistical evidence also confirms that the relationship between 
faculty job stress and administrative intensity is stronger for staff intensity (i.e., ratio of 
faculty to staff workers) than it is for executive intensity (i.e., ratio of faculty to executive 
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workers), confirming theory that the work of faculty is more loosely coupled with 
executive workers than it is with staff workers. A potential explanation is that faculty 
interact with staff and administrative staff on a day-to-day basis, which has a more direct 
effect on faculty stress than the faculty/executive interactions, which are more sporadic 
and generally more strategic and tactical than operational in nature.   
In organizational studies, competing theories predict opposing effects in the 
relationship between administrative intensity and outcomes. It has been suggested that 
overloaded bureaucracies are inefficient, leading to fewer resources for other 
organizational functions and thus lower performance (Bohte, 2001). Others argue that 
under-addressed bureaucratic needs result in coordination problems that push frontline 
workers to worry more about back-end coordination issues and less about client and 
customer needs (Smith & Meier, 1994; Meier, Polinard, & Wrinkle, 2000). A synthesis of 
both theories suggests that the relationship between administrative intensity and 
organizational performance is an inverse U shape (Rutherford, 2015). That is, there is a 
sweet spot in administrative intensity where organizations have enough bureaucracy to 
handle coordination issues but not too much bureaucracy so as to create inefficiencies. 
This research adds to the administrative intensity literature in organization studies by 
suggesting job stress as another outcome affected by changes to administrative intensity. 
This research adds to the higher education literature by bringing in an organizational 
structure variable to the study of faculty job stress, adding to the many studies that have 
already examined faculty job stress from various angles such as gender, discipline, rank, 
tenure, time constraints, rewards and recognition, departmental and institutional 
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influences, race, marital status, home obligations, health concerns, and unclear 
obligations, among others. 
In practice, predicting the job stress of frontline workers is important for at least 
three reasons. First, findings from this research give university leaders more information 
as they react to macro-trends and arguments about administrative bloat at universities. 
Second, in his seminal work on frontline workers, Lipsky (2010, p. 37) was concerned 
that frontline workers who were stressed would become demoralized and desensitized to 
the people they were serving, who would then have to deal with longer wait times and 
less individual attention. When Lipsky’s (2010) concern is extended to the case of higher 
education, the fear is that having over-stressed faculty will have detrimental effects on 
students and student outcomes. Finally, evidence from other fields suggests that as job 
stress decreases creativity (Çekmecelioğlu & Günsel, 2011) (Coelho, Augusto, & Lages, 
2011) and job satisfaction (Ruyter, Wetzels, & Feinberg, 2001). The negative effect of 
job stress on creativity is particularly relevant to faculty, due to the creative nature of 
their research work. 
A long, standing debate exists regarding the size of the administrative component 
within university organizations. While it is true that administrative costs have risen at 
U.S. universities over the last 30 years (Bergmann, 1991; Greene, Kisida, & Mills, 2012; 
Desrochers & Kirshstein, 2014), the underlying mechanisms explaining such growth in 
administration is still under debate (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; see also Bowen, 1980; 
Baumol, 1967). A hallmark of the research on university administrative bloat places 
organizational bureaucracy as a dependent variable to be explained (Archibald & 
Feldman, 2008). Rather than viewing bureaucracy purely as a result of exogenous forces, 
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this research takes the viewpoint that the size and structure of internal bureaucracy is also 
a strategic decision made by top management teams. Viewing bureaucracy as a strategic 
lever shifts the focus from bureaucracy as a dependent variable to be explained and 
necessitates that bureaucracy within an organization also be viewed as an independent 
variable that affects organizational outcomes. This distinction is an important next step in 
the progression of research on administrative bloat at universities because it takes the 
research back to the fundamental question of whether and how changing the size or 
structure of bureaucracy affects outcomes.  
LITERATURE 
Job Stress 
Psychologists acknowledge that work stress affects workers both positively and 
negatively depending on whether the stressor is perceived as a challenge (generally 
positive effects) or as a hindrance (generally negative effects) (Cavanaugh, Boswell, 
Roehling, & Boudreau, 2000; Steinert, 2011). In this paper, administrative work refers to 
any work that may come up as part of the traditional faculty roles of teaching, research, 
or service, or work that is associated with formal administrative positions that could be 
performed by faculty members themselves or by non-faculty support, staff, and 
administrative workers who are also working in the university. All parts of the faculty job 
description, including teaching, research, service, and formal administrative positions, are 
associated with administrative tasks that can be stressful. However, anecdotal evidence 
would suggest that each part of the faculty work experience can be perceived differently 
as a challenge stressor or as a hindrance stressor. For example, stress stemming from 
research and its associated administrative tasks might be perceived as challenge stressors 
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and have a positive effect that might spillover to teaching or service, or they might be 
hindrance stressors that inhibits quality teaching by pulling faculty attention from student 
needs. Similarly, stress stemming from service responsibilities and their associated 
administrative tasks might be viewed as hindrance stressors and have a negative effect on 
overall productivity, or it might challenge faculty to work more efficiently at other 
aspects of their job.  
Determining whether shadow work that is pushed onto faculty workloads because 
of changes in administrative intensity acts as a hindrance stressor or a challenge stressor 
is not the purpose of this study. Rather, in this study it is implied that the administrative 
work that faculty must take on as a result of understaffed administrative positions is 
generally a hindrance stressor and thus a negative outcome. This implication is 
reasonable because evidence from front-line workers in other arenas suggests that stress 
stemming from internal administrative work is a stressor hindrance. For example, among 
police officers, a long and varied stream of research supports the contention that 
administrative work among police officers negatively affects police officer stress and 
outcomes more than other stressful job characteristics, such as dangerous situations 
(Kroes, Hurrell, & Margolis, 1974; Crank & Caldero, 1991; Brooks & Piquero, 1998; 
Zhao, He, & Lovrich, 2002; Stinchcomb, 2004; Morash, Haarr, & Kwak, 2006). 
Faculty Job Stress 
 Gmelch and colleagues’ (1986) seminal study of faculty job stress at doctoral 
granting institutions resulted in the delineation of five general dimensions that predict 
faculty stress: reward and recognition, time constraints, departmental influence, 
professional identity, and student interaction. This early study found that there were no 
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differences in job stress based on in disciplinary categories but that there were differences 
in tenure, rank, age, gender, and marital status (Gmelch et. al, 1986). Later studies 
determined other individual characteristics to be significant antecedents to job stress, 
including off campus stressors such as family obligations, marital frictions, or health 
concerns (Dey, 1993); work life integration (Eddy & Gaston-Gayles, 2008); gender – in 
which research found that women and men perceive job structures and content similarly 
but women experience higher overall stress but also cope better with demands placed 
upon them (Doyle & Hind, 1998); and stress due to race discrimination that has negative 
salience for faculty of color (Eagan Jr & Garvey, 2015).  
 Research has also examined job stress as a predictor of other outcomes, such as  
intention to leave (Ryan, Healy, & Sullivan, 2012); whether sense of community 
moderates the relationship between job stress and intention to leave (Barnes, Agago, & 
Coombs, 1998); the consideration of leaving specifically to another university (Ryan et 
al., 2012); burnout (Doyle & Hind, 1998); and job satisfaction (Leung, Siu, & Spector, 
2000). 
 However, the academic research is not aligned on some findings and subsequent 
research found opposite effects when compared to earlier studies. For example, Gmelch 
and colleagues (1986) find no differences in job stress across academic disciplines while 
Smith and colleagues (1995) do find job stress differences across academic disciplines. 
Gmelch and colleagues (1984) found that teaching is more stressful than research or 
service while Thorsen (1996) found that teaching is the least stressful of faculty job 
duties. Differences in findings may be attributed to the differences in type of university 
being studied or the type of faculty under study. For example student interactions and 
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under-prepared students are the greatest source of stress for distance educators (Mclean, 
2006).  
 Of interest to the present study is whether organizational structures and the job 
characteristics that result affect faculty job stress. While administrative intensity has not 
been specifically tested on faculty job stress, other studies examine organizational level 
practices and how they affect faculty job stress. For example, Leung and colleagues 
(2000) examined how organizational practices and job stress interact in the context of 
external locus of control. Other job characteristics that are predictors of faculty stress 
include the teaching / research conflict (Thorsen, 1996); overall role conflict (Cavanaugh 
et al., 2000); unclear expectations (Eddy & Gaston-Gayles, 2008); and time and resource 
constraints (Gmelch et al., 1984). Perhaps the closest study to the topic at hand is a 
conference presentation on administrative bureaucracy and red tape and their effects on 
faculty stress (Koester & Clark, 1980), but this study was exploratory and did not 
examine administrative intensity as its measure of administrative bureaucracy. 
HYPOTHESES 
The Effect of Administrative Intensity on Job Stress 
The lack of contemporary research on formal structure and its effect on faculty 
outcomes necessitates a look back at research and theory on formal structure in 
organization studies. Prior to the 1950s, organizational research was largely focused on 
questions of organizational design and formal structure (Hammond, 1990, p. 144). 
Central to this focus was Luther Gulick’s (1937) conceptual framework of organizational 
design within which concepts such as division of labor and span of control were 
delineated. Herb Simon’s (1947) response to Gulick (1937) focused on administrative 
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behavior instead of structure, emphasizing the importance of psychology and sociology in 
understanding organizations. The influence of Simon’s (1947) response to Gulick (1937) 
and Simon’s subsequent work on behavior cannot be understated; since then a focus on 
physiological and sociological predictors of traditional organizational behavior outcomes 
such as job stress or job satisfaction has overshadowed work on how formal structure in 
bureaucracy and administration affect these types of outcomes. Despite the field wide de-
emphasis on structure, ‘no one has ever demonstrated, either theoretically or empirically, 
the irrelevance of the formal structure” (Hammond, 1990, p. 144). A balanced approach 
acknowledges the importance of both the formal and informal aspects of organizations. 
Thus, the ability to influence employee stress is a function of psychological and 
sociological interventions but also the organizational design choices that result in 
administrative structures.  
Gulick’s (1937) concept of ‘division of labor’ speaks to the organizing aspect by 
which labor is divided according to purpose, process, and place; division of labor is 
central to the main thrust of this current research. Faculty at research universities have a 
wide range of labor activities across teaching, research, service, and administration, all of 
which come with varying levels administrative responsibility. Other types of labor roles 
within universities, such as administrative staff, have narrower ranges of labor that 
consist mostly of administrative responsibilities that more indirectly affect outcomes. The 
wide range of faculty labor activities means that the division of labor between faculty and 
staff may overlap at times. One of the most common examples is for staff and faculty to 
in share administrative duties. Therefore, when shortages or surpluses in staffing levels 
occur, faculty feel the effect most directly in their administrative work loads. 
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Support Staff Hypothesis. Within universities, two job roles within the 
bureaucracy potentially affect faculty stress from administrative responsibilities: 
executive management and support staff. Administrative assistants and support staff 
workers have day-to-day interactions with faculty as they coordinate meetings, programs, 
and do non-strategic administrative work at the school or department level. Because 
faculty share administrative responsibilities with support staff and administrative 
assistants, faculty are directly affected by changes in staff intensity (i.e., ratio of faculty 
to support and administrative staff) in the level of administrative work they must assume. 
The expectation is that as the ratio of faculty to support staff increases, faculty become 
increasingly stressed as they take on administrative duties. Previous findings connecting 
faculty stress to organizational constructs such as role conflict (Cavanaugh et al., 2000); 
unclear expectations (Eddy & Gaston-Gayles, 2008); and time and resource constraints 
(Gmelch et al., 1984) reinforce this hypothesis, which is formalized as follows: 
 
H1: Larger faculty to support staff ratios are associated with more faculty stress 
from administrative responsibilities. 
 
Executive Employee Hypothesis. Unlike their relationship with support staff, 
faculty interact with executive level employees at a university on a more sporadic basis. 
The role of the executive administrators in a system like a research university is to 
solidify ties with faculty with a combination of practices, such as symbol management, 
selective centralization, consistent articulation of a common vision, interpretation of 
diverse actions in terms of common themes, and a common language (Weick, 1982, p. 
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676). In other words, the major part of the connection between the typical faculty 
member and executive and mid-level management is strategic and symbolic in nature. 
Despite the differences in the faculty-support staff relationship from the faculty-executive 
relationship, the theoretical mechanism connecting executive intensity and faculty stress 
is similar. As there are relatively fewer executives and managers, faculty take on more 
work and are more stressed. Similar to clerical staff, the expectation is that as the relative 
number of faculty to increase relative to executive staff, faculty stress from 
administrative responsibilities will increase.  
 
H2: Larger faculty to executive worker ratios are associated with more faculty 
stress from administrative responsibilities. 
 
Comparison Hypothesis. Understanding the relative impact that both support 
staff and executive workers have on faculty job stress is also important in practice as 
university leaders make human resource choices. The major difference between support 
staff and executive workers as it pertains to their effect on faculty job stress is the relative 
closeness with which each interacts with faculty. The idea of loose coupling, first ported 
to social science in the early 1970’s (Glassman, 1973), relates to the degree of different 
groups’ independence and closeness within a system. In his seminal study Weick (1976) 
observed that educational organizations are loosely coupled. To Weick (1976) loose 
coupling between groups in an organization occurs when groups “are somehow attached, 
but that each retains some identity and separateness and that their attachment may be 
circumscribed, infrequent, weak in its mutual affects, unimportant, and/or slow to 
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respond” (p. 3). Weick’s description describes the relationship between faculty, support 
staff, and executive workers because each group retains a unique identity but is 
interdependent in a university. Each group is separate and their attachments to each other 
are certainly circumscribed. Because faculty - executive staff interactions are more 
sporadic and strategic in nature than the day-to-day operational interactions between 
faculty and support staff, faculty are more loosely coupled with executive workers than 
they are with support staff. The tighter coupling between support staff and faculty also 
suggests that changes in staff intensity would more directly affect faculty job stress than 
executive intensity. Though executive intensity might still be impactful on faculty job 
stress, the expectation is that its effect is more indirect and, therefore, weaker. Hypothesis 
three formalizes this connection. 
 
H3: Staff intensity will have a larger effect on faculty job stress than executive 
intensity. 
 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Data for this research comes from two sources that were merged together. Data 
from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) provides measures 
for workforce counts, which were used to calculate administrative intensities, and full-
time enrollments. Survey data providing information about faculty job stress comes from 
the Netwise I survey that was deployed in the 2006-07 school year. The survey asked 
about collaboration and advice networks, research activities, including grant submissions 
and success rates, teaching and service responsibilities, attitudes and involvement in 
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interdisciplinary research, work environment, job satisfaction, job stress, and detailed 
demographic and academic background questions.  
The survey was implemented and completed online using Sawtooth Software®.  
The survey population was invited via traditional mail and a series of personalized 
follow-up emails. Each invitation provided individually assigned user-ids and passwords 
and direction to the online survey. Overall, the survey took between 30-45 minutes to 
complete. The population was constructed by manual retrieval of information from 
department and university directories from 151 universities in the U.S. that were 
designated as “Research Extensive” universities under the 2005 Carnegie Classification 
system. The disciplines (biological sciences, chemistry, computer science, earth and 
atmospheric sciences, electrical engineering, and physics) were selected based on the 
level of female representation (low, transitioning, and high fields). 
From the population of universities, 3667 faculty were selected and 1774 
completed surveys. Of the completed surveys, 176 were removed because of ineligible 
rank or discipline. Also, 21 partially completed surveys were deemed to have sufficient 
information to be included (over 95 % of questions answered). These changes led to a 
final analysis sample size of 1598 surveys, and thus the overall survey response rate 
using the RR2 method of the American Association for Public Opinion Research 
(AAPOR) was 45.8% and the weighted response rate was 43.0%. The final analysis 
subset for this research, after observations with missing values were deleted, consists of 
1127 academic scientists (for more information on survey administration, see Jha & 
Welch, 2010). The IPEDS data, along with data the survey was then linked together for 
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the analysis. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for all of the variables in the 
analysis.  
Table 3:  Summary Statistics, Administrative Intensity and Job Stress   
Variable Mean    St. Dev. Min Max 
Stress from admin. responsibilities** 1.82 0.86 0 3 
Stress from relationships with colleagues 1.33 0.86 0 3 
Stress from publishing demands 1.87 0.83 0 3 
Stress from teaching responsibilities 1.86 0.78 0 3 
Stress from work / family balance 1.89 0.87 0 3 
Stress from obtaining external funding  2.42 0.87 0 3 
Faculty / staff ratio 2005-06 2.62 1.44 0.42 7.96 
Faculty / executive ratio 2005-06 1.02 0.59 0.3 4 
Dean 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Department Chair 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Research Center Director 0.06 0.23 0 1 
# Department Committees 3.48 1.35 1 6 
# University Committees 2.18 1.3 1 6 
Assistant Professor 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Associate Professor 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Total Full Time Equiv. Enroll. Fall 2006 23,742 11,211 2,116 51,668 
Total University Employees 2005-06 9,909 5,359 440 22,641 
Executive Turnover 2004-05 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Executive Turnover 2005-06 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Satisfied with University Reputation 2.69 0.76 1 4 
Married 1.27 0.66 1 4 
Caucasian 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Asian 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Non-Asian Minority 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Private Non-profit Control (vs. public) 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Notes: ** Stress from administrative responsibilities is the dependent variable in the 
analysis.  The other stress variables are included for contextual comparison.  
 
Measures 
Dependent variable: stress from administrative responsibilities. To measure 
various aspects of work stress, respondents were asked the following question in the 
survey: “To what extent are the following factors currently a source of stress in your 
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work?” Among the factors to assess were ‘administrative responsibilities,’ ‘relationships 
with colleagues,’ ‘publishing demands,’ teaching responsibilities,’ ‘time allocation 
between work and family,’ and ‘demands for obtaining external research funding,’ to 
which respondents could respond with ‘Substantial.’ ‘Moderate,’ ‘Minimum,’ and 
‘None.’ Taken all together, these measures have a Chronbach’s Alpha of .61 indicating 
moderate scale reliability of overall work stress. Exploratory factor analysis of the entire 
battery further confirms the weakness of overall job stress as a function of the entire 
battery (See Appendix B).  
Nevertheless, the use of a single-item measurement does not preclude further 
analysis, and single-item measures have their merits. Single-item measures may be easier 
and take less time to complete, may be less expensive, may be more flexible than 
multiple-item scales, and, most importantly, may contain more face validity (Nagy, 
2002). Though single-item measures preclude the analyses of reliability, they are very 
common in fields like public administration (Cantarelli, Belardinelli, & Belle, 2016). For 
the current research, only the measure for job stress from administrative responsibilities 
was included as a dependent variable. Admittedly, this is a weakness in the study, though 
the outcomes of the analysis that correlate it with a variable from a separate 
administrative dataset and various administrative job functions strengthen the argument 
for its use. 
Focal variables. In this analysis, executive workers are defined as the sum of 
‘executive and managerial employees’ and ‘other professional employees’ that each 
university reported to IPEDS. Support staff are defined as the number of ‘clerical and 
secretarial employees’ within the university as reported to IPEDS. To measure 
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administrative intensity, the number of full and part-time instructional workers was 
divided by both types of administrative workers to come up with two relative ratios of 
administrative intensity: 1) staff intensity, and 2) executive intensity. Because the 
outcome variable in this analysis is a faculty survey response, a relative ratio directly 
relating the number of faculty to the two different types of administrators is appropriate.   
The analysis uses a one year lag for both administrative intensity measures. There 
were various reasons for this, both practical and theoretical. While administrative 
intensity does change year over year, changes across years is generally not very large. 
Furthermore, as administrators are hired, a certain lag period is required for them to learn 
their job and where to best fill in on the administrative duties. Thus, analyzing the one 
year lag of administrative intensity will enable these processes to sort themselves out. 
Practically, count data on IPEDS is only available for each school on odd years.         
Control variables. Other factors influence administrative stress experienced by 
faculty. Most significantly, administrative appointments such as dean, department chair, 
and center director as well as committee participation at the department or university 
level will carry with them administrative responsibilities. Expectations for the 
relationship between these administrative appointments and faculty stress from 
administrative responsibilities are fairly straightforward. Similar to administrative 
appointments, rank along the tenure track will influence administrative stress. Due to the 
common practice of shielding newer professors less far along on the tenure track from 
administrative and service duties, I expect that relative to full professors, assistant and 
associate professors will experience less stress from administrative responsibilities.  
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To measure administrative appointments, dummy variables indicate whether a 
faculty was a dean, department chair, or center director. Counts measured the number of 
university and department committees on which faculty serve. Academic rank was 
measured with dummy variable indicating whether the faculty was an assistant professor 
or associate professor with full professor being the base case. Table 4 summarizes the 
measurement and source of the dependent and focal independent variables in the analysis. 
Table 4: Survey Questions of Focal Variables, Administrative Intensity and Job 
Stress 




Stress from administrative 
responsibilities –  
To what extent are the 
following factors currently a 
source of stress in your work? 
Administrative Responsibilities 
3 - Substantial 
2 – Moderate 
1 - Minimum 
0 - None 
 
Main Independent Variables 
 




# Instructional Employees /  
# Clerical and Secretarial 
Employees 
Faculty / executive ratio 
 
IPEDS 
# Instructional Employees /  
(# Executive and Managerial +  
# Other Professional 
Employees) 
Selected Control Variables 
Administrative 
Appointments 
Please tell us whether you 






1 – Yes 
0 - No 
Faculty Rank 




1 – Yes 
0 - No 
 
  63 
Much literature on organizational structure in the 1970s advanced the idea that 
organization size was as key determinant of administrative intensity (Freeman & 
Kronenfeld, 1973; Millan & Daft, 1979; MacMillan & Daft, 1984; Dogramaci, 1977; 
Kimberly, 1976; Blau, 1970; Blau, 1972). Therefore, full-time equivalent enrollment of 
undergraduates and graduate students for the year 2006-2007 school year as well as the 
total size of the workforce were included in the analysis to account for organization size. 
Presumably, other variables would influence faculty administrative stress. Finally, control 
variables for gender, race/ethnicity, academic field and sector of university ownership 
(whether public or private non-profit) were also included in the analysis.  
Analysis 
  The model building began with an analysis and understanding of the dependent 
variable. As a response to a Likert Scale question, the administrative stress variable is an 
ordered set of options that turn out to be normally distributed (see Appendix B), making 
it appropriate for use according to statistical theory and regression analysis. The ordered  
nature of the variable suggest an ordered logit model, though ordinary least squares and a 
multi-level model to account for variation in at both university and individual levels were 
also run as robustness checks (see Appendix B). The first model was run with only 
control variables, then each of the two focal variable were added incrementally and tested 
on their own until the final model, which included all focal and control variables. A two-
tailed post-estimation test of the final model examined the difference between the staff 
intensity and executive intensity coefficients.  
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Results 
 Tables 5 presents the results of the analysis. Using model 4, hypotheses H1 and 
H3 were confirmed and H2 was rejected. Staff intensity had a substantively small, but 
statistically significant (p < .05) effect on faculty stress from administrative 
responsibilities. Both the size and statistical significance of this effect held as the other 
focal variable for executive intensity was added to the analysis. The two-tailed post-
estimation test of the focal coefficients revealed that the coefficient for staff intensity was 
statistically different from the executive intensity coefficient (p<.05). Because the staff 
intensity coefficient is larger than the executive intensity coefficient it is clear that the 
effect of clerical intensity is both statistically different and larger than the executive 
intensity coefficient. Of particular note, all of the variables measuring administrative 
appointments had strong substantive and statistical significance (p < .01), as well the 
variable for assistant professors (p < .01), who had reduced administrative stress in 
relation to full professors. 
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Table 5: Ordered Logit Models Predicting Stress from Admin. Responsibilities  
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
VARIABLES O-Logit O-Logit O-Logit O-Logit 
     
Clerical Intensity  0.09***  0.09** 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Executive Intensity   0.01 0.01 
   (0.01) (0.01) 
Department Chair 2.80*** 2.82*** 2.81*** 2.82*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Dean 2.30*** 2.34*** 2.31*** 2.35*** 
 (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) 
Center Director 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.79*** 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Assistant Prof. -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.64*** -0.64*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Associate Prof. -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Log Undergrad FTE -0.11 -0.17* -0.13 -0.18** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Log Graduate FTE 0.09 0.01 0.08 -0.00 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Log Total Workers -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.11 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
Female 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
South Asian -0.38* -0.37* -0.38* -0.37* 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
Other Asian -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Black 0.84* 0.85* 0.84* 0.85* 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
Hispanic 0.57* 0.58* 0.57* 0.58* 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) 
Native American -1.18 -1.20 -1.19 -1.20 
 (0.75) (0.74) (0.75) (0.74) 
Other Race -0.16 -0.12 -0.16 -0.12 
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) 
Private Control (vs. Public) 0.26** 0.24* 0.28** 0.25* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Chemistry 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Computer Science -0.27* -0.30* -0.27* -0.30* 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Electrical Engineering -0.36** -0.39** -0.35** -0.38** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Physics 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
Ordered Logit Cuts     
     
Cut1 -3.54*** -3.32*** -3.497*** -3.29*** 
 (0.80) (0.81) (0.81) (0.81) 
Cut2 -1.37* -1.14 -1.32* -1.12 
 (0.80) (0.80) (0.80) (0.80) 
Cut3 0.62 0.85 0.67 0.88 
 (0.80) (0.80) (0.80) (0.80) 
     
Observations 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Biology is the base field. Caucasian is the base 
race/ethnicity. Base rank is full professor. 
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Post-estimation test of Model 4 reveal the difference between the coefficients for clerical 
and executive intensity are statistically different at the p<0.05 level (Chi Squared = 5.14, 
p=0.02). 
 
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research tests how formal structure affects job stress of faculty at research 
universities in the United States. In this sense, it is a marriage of the old focus on 
organizational structure and a newer focus on behavioral factors in the work 
environment. It has been argued that too much bureaucracy is inefficient and that too 
little bureaucracy results in poor coordination (Rutherford, 2015). This paper 
demonstrates that administrative intensity is associated with frontline worker stress from 
administrative responsibilities, making the consideration of administrative intensity more 
complex than just a coordination and efficiency problem. In other words, to the extent 
that frontline workers have behavioral or psychological responses in the form of stress to 
changes in administrative intensity, the relationship between bureaucratic size and 
organizational outcomes becomes more nuanced. 
While administrative staff levels had a statistically significant effect on faculty 
stress from administrative responsibilities, executive intensity had no statistically 
significant effect on faculty stress. As noted earlier, the relationship between the average 
faculty member and executives is largely symbolic and strategic, making their 
relationship more ‘loosely coupled’ (Weick, 1976; Weick, 1982) than the day-to-day 
relationship of faculty and support staff. This theoretical distance may explain the 
difference in results between the two types of administrative workers.  
As noted, a major limitation of the study is the dependent variables based on a 
single perceptual measure. However, the results of the analysis speak to the validity of 
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the measure. All of the administrative positions (department chair, dean, and center 
director) had strong correlations with this measure of administrative stress, which is a 
highly intuitive result. Furthermore, assistant professors had much less administrative 
stress than full professors, which aligns with the common practice of shielding assistant 
professors from large administrative loads. Nevertheless, a stress measure coming from 
multiple survey questions would probably have less measurement error and more 
reliability. This study benefits from the fact that some of the predictors in the analysis 
came from sources other than the faculty survey, an approach that reduces common 
method and common source bias (Favero & Bullock, 2015). It should also be noted that 
the faculty in these data represent STEM disciplines from hard science, whose research is 
typically more contingent on support staff than social science and humanities researchers 
or researchers in professional schools. Therefore, the relationships between faculty in 
hard science may be more closely coupled with support staff than the relationships 
between non-hard science faculty and support staff and thus similar findings may not 
occur in these different populations of faculty. Prior research supports this contention, as 
faculty from hard and applied sciences have been found to desire more instrumental 
support while faculty in soft fields prefer social support (Neumann & Finaly-Neumann, 
1990).  
 Predicting an organizational behavior outcome like faculty stress is important 
because stress may have various effects on other outcomes. Stress from administrative 
burdens may have a number of effects on faculty productivity. In one scenario, increased 
administrative stress will cut into research, teaching, or service productivity, but overall 
work levels will remain. In another scenario, increased administrative stress will not cut 
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into research, teaching, or service productivity but work-life balance will suffer. In a final 
scenario, increased administrative stress will cut into research, teaching, or service 
productivity and work-life balance. In each of these scenarios, student outcomes could 
also be affected as could job outcomes like turnover intentions. Further research could 
test which of these scenarios is most likely to occur under certain circumstances. 
This research demonstrates that the relationship between administrative intensity 
and organizational outcomes is a function of coordination, efficiency, and the 
psychological response among frontline workers to changes in administrative intensity. 
Further research could test other factors that influence or moderate the relationship 
between administrative intensity and outcomes. For example, the effect of administrative 
intensity on organizational efficiency is further complicated by the concept of 
organizational slack, which suggests that organizations never operate at optimum 
efficiency but maintain certain amounts of resource cushions to better deal with changes 
in the environment (Cyert & March, 1963). Slack allows leaders to experiment with new 
postures towards the environment, either in product or management innovation. Because 
they can dip into existing latent resources, experimentation becomes a luxury enabled by 
slack. Therefore, referring back the relationship between administrative intensity and 
schoolwide faculty behavior and outcomes, even when enough resources have been 
allocated to control the coordination problem, creating slack does not immediately lead to 
lower performance. As more administrative staff are added to the organization with less 
and less coordinating to do, many scenarios play out as a result. Administrators working 
in a sinecure could enjoy their easy job, the organization would be highly inefficient, and 
there would be fewer resources to higher more frontline workers. Administrators working 
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in a sinecure could also come up with work to do through new programs or initiatives, 
which at face value might reduce the efficiency problem but could also lead to strategic 
drift in which resources and time are then funneled to non-core functions that indirectly 
affect outcomes both positively and negatively. Finally, administrators could use the 
slack for positive innovation leading to improvements in productivity or efficiency. Thus, 
excess administrative staff can either be considered an inefficiency, which has negative 
effects on the organization, or slack, which has positive and negative effects on 
organizational outcomes. 
 The findings from the research have implications for human resource decisions at 
universities and other types of organizations. Results from this study suggest that 
reducing the relative number of support staff increases faculty stress, which may have a 
detrimental effect on faculty productivity and ultimately student outcomes. This research 
is at the university level, and so the findings must be understood in context of the theory 
that explains the findings. The theory is that the close coupling between frontline workers 
(i.e., faculty) and backend workers (i.e. support staff) is what drives frontline worker 
stress with changes to staff intensity. If support staff or backend workers are not closely 
coupled with frontline workers, then changes in the number of support staff or backend 
workers will theoretically have little effect on frontline worker stress but may affect them 
through coordination or efficiency problems. Further research with more detailed data 
about the relative closeness between faculty or frontline workers and different types of 
staff and backend workers could determine the interaction effects that close coupling and 
administrative intensity have on workers. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ESSAY 3: THE EFFECTS OF ROLE CLARITY AND INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
ON TWO MEASURES OF FACULTY JOB SATISFACTION 
This paper examines faculty job satisfaction at universities as it relates to a few 
aspects of the faculty – administration interactive frame. In particular, it tests whether 
role clarity for faculty and administrators and institutional support for faculty leaders 
affect faculty job satisfaction. The traditional faculty position in higher education 
maintains a relatively wide range of job duties, from the front facing aspects of teaching 
and mentoring, to knowledge creation as part of the research enterprise, and internal 
management and organizational maintenance as part of administrative and service work. 
This clear separation of duties is reflected in research studies that examine each of 
teaching and research. This research is no different except that unlike much of the 
academic research on faculty work (Link, Swann, & Bozeman, 2008; Fairweather, 2005; 
Hagedorn, 2000), this research instead focuses on the aspects of faculty work that are part 
of service assignments or informal administrative appointments.  
This paper adds to academic literature in at least two ways: 1) despite the massive 
history of literature on job satisfaction much of that literature focuses on business settings 
while specific knowledge of faculty job satisfaction in university settings historically has 
been more limited (E. A. Locke, Fitzpatrick, & White, 1983) – this research adds to the 
subset of faculty job satisfaction literature that has only taken hold in more recent 
decades, and 2) among the faculty job satisfaction literature common predictors include 
demographics, disciplinary differences, workplace issues, institutional differences and the 
tension between teaching and research (Bozeman & Gaughan, 2011) as these two usually 
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take up the most faculty work time and create the most conflict within and between 
faculty members (Hattie & Marsh, 1996). With its focus on administrative interactions of 
faculty, this research rounds out the balance of faculty job satisfaction literature.   
Understanding the links between role clarity and support to faculty job 
satisfaction is important in practice for at least three reasons. First, as universities react to 
macro trends such as unbundling of faculty roles, unbundling of services, neoliberalism, 
liberal arts decline, or administrative bloat the relative size of university administrations 
decline or grow along with the administrative support they can provide to faculty. As a 
result faculty must shoulder or drop administrative duties to deal with these changes; role 
clarity about and support for their service and administrative duties will help maintain 
faculty job satisfaction during the growing pains that accompany these types of 
transitions. Furthermore, to the extent that bureaucratic drift (McCubbins, Noll, & 
Weingast, 1987) affects university rules as bureaucracies alter the original intent of rules 
to their own benefit, role clarity between faculty and administrators becomes even more 
important for improving or maintaining faculty job satisfaction. 
Second, as university leaders better understand the determinants of faculty job 
satisfaction, university administrators can recruit and retain better talent (Johnsrud & 
Heck, 1994; Seifert & Umbach, 2008; (Smart, 1990; Weiler, 1985; Rosser, 2004), better 
compete with private industry for talent (Zumeta & Raveling, 2001), as well as create 
strategies to improve performance given that the link between job satisfaction and 
performance has some merit (Petty, McGee, & Cavender, 1984; Judge, Thoresen, Bono, 
& Patton, 2001). And finally, as public policy makers better understand faculty job 
  72 
satisfaction, they can formulate policies to improve the pipeline of workers to educational 
and knowledge creation organizations (Boyer, 1997; Bozeman & Gaughan 2011).    
LITERATURE 
Job Satisfaction 
General overview. The academic literature on job satisfaction is historic and 
crosses many disciplines. For example, in the 1950's Herzberg and colleagues (1957) 
reviewed around two thousand papers on job satisfaction that had been produced by that 
time. Simple extrapolation with most types of growth curves would put the number of 
papers on job satisfaction now, almost seventy years later, into the tens of thousands, an 
estimate supported by citation counts of seminal job satisfaction research (see Herzberg, 
1966;. Porter, Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974). Given the scope of this research and 
the multitude of findings on job satisfaction a comprehensive overview of the job 
satisfaction is not feasible though a few general theories have gained prominence. For 
example, the idea that job satisfaction results from a person interacting with his or her 
work environment has been around for 80 years. As far back as 1939, Roethlisberger and 
Diekson (1939/2003) suggested that workers’ attitudes towards objects in the work 
environment can be analogous to “the relation between an organism and its physical 
environment . . .” (261-262). 
 Herzberg's comprehensive review led to what is perhaps the most influential 
theory on job satisfaction, the two-factor theory, which argues that job satisfaction lies 
along two planes (Herzberg, 1966). On one plane, ‘hygiene’ factors are posited to cause 
one to not be dissatisfied with their job, while on another plane the ‘motivating’ factors 
are posited to cause one to be satisfied with their job. Hygiene factors include 
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organizational policies, administration, relationships with supervisors, peers, and 
subordinates, work conditions, salary, status, and security. Motivators include 
achievement, recognition, responsibility, advancement, and growth. Herzberg’s theory 
has some intuitive appeal but is also quit controversial and does not always maintain 
predictive power (Smerek & Peterson, 2007). Disentangling the two planes of satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction comes with many methodological issues and difficulties. Furthermore, 
many of the hygiene and motivating factors have been found to cause both dissatisfaction 
and satisfaction, though some in the field of  positive psychology have found new support 
for the two-factor theory since other psychological constructs, such as happiness, have 
been found to fall along two planes as well (Sachau, 2007). 
 Another theory, Locke’s (1969) Theory V or Values Theory, posits that if values 
– one’s conceptions of what is good, desirable or beneficial – are what guide actions and 
emotions, then values should also guide job satisfaction. Thus, if one’s values are 
satisfied in the workplace, then that person will be satisfied with his or her job. Such 
theory aligns closely with the basics of expectancy theory (Mowday, 1982; Wigfield & 
Eccles, 2000), a common theory of motivation in organizational behavior, which argues 
that individuals make choices based on their estimates of how well the expected results 
from their behavior will match up with their desired results (Vroom, 1964). Like the 
expectancy theory of motivation, values theory of job satisfaction is a flexible theory in 
that it relies on the varying values of employees, not the mechanism of one specific 
value, as its predictive power. General themes among values may also arise across groups 
of employees or organizations due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1947) and 
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).   
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 In general, however, people want work that corresponds to their interests, that 
they feel is important, that requires their valued expertise, that has varied assignments, 
that allows them autonomy, responsibility, and a sense of achievement and recognition. 
Also, employees want clarity both for their work tasks but also in the requirements put on 
them by different people, supervisors, and co-workers. Finally, employees want the tools 
and support necessary to get their job done (Gruneberg, 1979).  
Antecedents to faculty job satisfaction. During the same time frame that 
Herzberg and colleagues (1957) were reviewing the extant work on job satisfaction, 
Caplow and McGee (1958) observed that academics had applied the methods of social 
research to every important institution except their own. Though more recent than the 
general work on job satisfaction, multiple studies report findings specific to faculty. 
Antecedents of faculty job satisfaction are often split among individual, work related, and 
institutional factors (Blackburn & Lawrence, 1995; Bozeman & Gaughan, 2011; 
Hagedorn, 2000) though specific factors certainly could be classified across multiple 
parts of this rough typology. In general, individual factors among university faculty that 
have been found to correlate with job satisfaction include gender (Seifert & Umbach, 
2008; Bilimoria et al., 2006; Sabharwal & Corley, 2009; Callister, 2006; Olsen, Maple, & 
Stage, 1995), race (Laden & Hagedorn, 2000; Olsen, Maple, & Stage, 1995), and stress 
levels (Leung et al., 2000).  
Work related factors affecting faculty job satisfaction include academic discipline 
(Seifert & Umbach, 2008; Sabharwal & Corley, 2009), relationships with students (Hill, 
1986; McKeachie, 1982 Willie & Stecklein, 1982), autonomy (McKeachie, 1982; Willie 
& Stecklein, 1982), social network determinants (Welch & Jha, 2015), and pay 
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(Hagedorn, 1996). Also, a common theme for decades has been role conflict, especially 
between teaching and research as many university faculty believe that teaching 
effectiveness is not adequately rewarded (Bess, 1977; Hattie & Marsh, 1996; 
Fairweather, 2005) or they disregard administrative decision making duties instead 
preferring to focus on teaching or research (Dykes, 1968). Finally, institutional factors 
include department climate (Callister, 2006), resources (Willie & Stecklein, 1982), and 
university administration (Lock et al 1983). 
Faculty job satisfaction as an outcome and measure. Because of the historical 
depth of the job satisfaction literature, the measurement of job satisfaction has likewise 
evolved. One most well-known and used measures of job satisfaction is the Job 
Description Index or JDI (Smith & And Others, 1969; Kinicki, McKee-Ryan, 
Schriesheim, & Carson, 2002), which is an index of various items and sub-dimensions of 
job satisfaction. While widespread use of indexed versions of job satisfaction remain 
widely in use, in recent decades research has tested the use of single-item measures of 
global job satisfaction and found that they correlate highly with indexed versions 
(Scarpello & Campbell, 1983; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997).  
In this study, job satisfaction is measured both globally and with an index of sub-
dimensions of faculty time allocation. Measuring the global job satisfaction of faculty 
aligns with more contemporary measures of job satisfaction and provides a snapshot into 
the overall satisfaction that faculty have with their job. Satisfaction with time allocations 
is also a unique and relevant measure for university faculty because of the wide range of 
faculty job roles and the autonomy that faculty enjoy. As mentioned, faculty members 
must spend time teaching, researching, doing service work, any administrative tasks 
  76 
associated with those roles, and formal administrative duties to varying degrees 
depending on their contract, the type of university at which they work, internal and 
external norms in their department, and formal appointments and assignments. In 
addition, personal attitudes and aptitudes allow faculty members to make marginal 
adjustments in time allocation to one or another of the general areas. This tension – the 
combination of the wide range of faculty duties and the various forces at play that pull 
faculty between these duties – make examining an index of faculty job satisfaction with 
time allocations very relevant for study.  
This paper focuses on the faculty-administration interactions, and how those 
affect faculty job satisfaction. Specifically, its focuses on 1) role clarity of faculty and 
administrators, and 2) institutional support for faculty leaders. Theoretically, role clarity 
and institutional support can affect global job satisfaction and also satisfaction with time 
allocations. The hypotheses that follow delve deeper into these connections.  
HYPOTHESES 
In relation to administrative work, research has examined antecedents to job 
satisfaction among full-time university administrators, such as the impact of state 
regulations (Volkwein, Malik, & Napierski-Prancl, 1998) and work climate (Volkwein & 
Zhou, 2003). Others studies examine the differences in job satisfaction among 
administrators in public versus private universities (Volkwein & Parmley, 2000), or even 
the facets of job satisfaction among administrators (Glick, 1992) but these studies all 
focus on full-time administrators, not faculty.  
Many faculty members enter academia with more clear ideas about the job 
requirements of teaching and research and less clear ideas about the job requirements for 
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formal administrative appointments and service work. Even when working in the job, 
many disregard the decision making and responsibilities of administration choosing 
rather to focus on teaching or research (Dykes, 1968). For many, the idea of being an 
administrator, decision maker, or manager might create stress and insecurity, which is 
common among many professionals who enter their profession for the technical or 
specialized work and not necessarily management (Hill, 2003). Likewise in academia, 
research and teaching both come with training and preparation, while service and 
administrative work is often learned on the fly. For these reasons, role clarity and support 
are vitally important for faculty members who take on administrative and leadership roles 
and as well as those in the department who do not currently work in such roles but may in 
the future. 
Role Clarity and Global Job Satisfaction 
Locke and colleagues (1983) (role clarity) and Olsen and colleagues (1995) 
(support) are among the few papers that examine administrative role clarity and 
administrative support as they relate to faculty job satisfaction. Unlike many quantitative 
studies, Locke et al (1983) is inductive and exploratory; their hope being that it would 
stimulate further more elaborate studies (p. 343). A central finding of their work is that 
job clarity was one of the strongest predictors of faculty job satisfaction. Furthermore, 
Locke and colleagues (1983) suggest that “job values that are more important to the 
individual have more influence on job attitudes than job values that are less important” 
(p. 344). In other words, the most important values to an employee will influence their 
job satisfaction the most (see Lawrence, Ott, & Bell, 2012). With this idea in mind and 
referring to Locke and colleagues’ (1983) central finding, it would not be unreasonable to 
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suggest that role clarity is a strong value among faculty members given that their roles 
can often be wide and varied. Role clarity enables faculty to understand how to be 
successful in their job. Role clarity is a value espoused in other fields (Lyons, 1971).  
Given that role clarity stems from the rules and procedures that govern that 
specific role, any dysfunction in those rules will result in unfocused clarity. Research has 
shown that rule dysfunction creates manager alienation leading to lower job satisfaction 
(DeHart-Davis & Pandey, 2009). Similarly, red tape has been shown to correlate with 
lower job satisfaction (Giauque, Ritz, Varone, & Anderfuhren-Biget, 2012). Previous 
research finds that role clarity has a positive effect on job satisfaction (Locke, et al, 1983; 
Daley, 1986; Ting, 1996; Wright & Davis, 2003). Wright and Davis (2003) explain that 
as workers understand more clearly the expectations placed upon them, the tensions of 
role ambiguity decrease while the likelihood of completing their responsibilities increases 
resulting in a higher degree of job satisfaction. With this in mind, this research 
hypothesizes that: 
 
H1a: Faculty who agree that their institution has clear rules about the roles and 
authority of faculty and administration report higher global job satisfaction. 
 
Role Clarity and Job Satisfaction with Time Allocations 
In the case of tenure-track university faculty, the clarity and relative importance 
of job duties are outlined both by professional norms and university rules and policies. In 
academia, professional norms have led to a general acceptance that faculty duties are 
spread across the three functions of research, teaching, and service, as well as formal 
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administrative positions (Boyer, 1997). The relative importance of research, teaching, 
service, and administration is determined both by type of university and by individual 
appointments. For example, research and teaching are largely determined by whether the 
university focuses more on research or teaching (i.e., Carnegie Classification). Service 
and administrative duties are largely determined by the faculty member’s administrative 
appointments, that person’s predisposition to volunteer for service work, and the needs of 
the department. Place along the tenure-track also affects administrative work with those 
who have passed tenure being more likely to shoulder administrative loads.  
For faculty members, the clarity and relative importance of their service and 
administrative work compared to their other academic work will be greatly affected by 
university rules and policies, or lack thereof, governing that work. Lack of role clarity 
with regard to faculty and administrative roles will affect faculty satisfaction with time 
allocations regardless of university type because even though there may be different 
norms for administrative roles across different university Carnegie classifications, unclear 
explicit rules leave open the possibility of implied rules which may be misinterpreted and 
lead to confusion, miscommunication, and dissatisfaction. In other words, the nature of 
this relationship is similar across all types of universities, precluding the need to separate 
across university type. Therefore, this paper also hypothesizes that: 
 
H1b: Faculty who agree that their institution has clear rules about the roles and 
authority of faculty and administration report higher satisfaction with time 
allocations. 
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Institutional Support and Global Job Satisfaction 
Like role clarity, institutional help or support is another aspect of work that 
enables workers in many fields to be more successful at their jobs (Baruch-Feldman, 
Brondolo, Ben-Dayan, & Schwartz, 2002; Ulleberg & Rundmo, 1997). The idea of 
support can be a somewhat vague as it has multiple connotations. The ten or so various 
definitions of ‘support’ according to Merriam-Webster include the following: “to 
promote the interests or cause of,”  “to uphold or defend as valid or right,” “to hold up or 
serve as a foundation or prop for,” and finally to “assist, help” (Merriam-Webster, n.d.). 
Based on these definitions, it is clear that support could be describing both an attitude, 
which in organizations may result in concrete rules or policies that aid the employees, or 
also a concrete service that results in actual work to promote the work of the employee. 
Given the fiduciary duties inherent to being an employee, receiving support (using any of 
the previous definitions) from decision makers higher up in the organizations would be 
highly valued. Functionally, the idea or concept of ‘institutional help’ for faculty leaders 
could manifest or be interpreted in at least two ways: 1) in the manifestation of attitudes 
that exude support, and 2) in the work of support workers. While supportive attitudes and 
realized support workers are ontologically different concepts, both have the same effect 
as theoretical mechanisms in explaining how the general idea of institutional support 
affects faculty job satisfaction. 
Evidence from other settings buttresses the idea that attitudinal support by an 
institution influences faculty job satisfaction. After splitting up administrative support 
among, informational, instrumental, emotional, and appraisal support, Littrell and 
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colleagues (1994) found that K-12 teachers who received informational and emotional 
support were more satisfied in their work. Among choral teachers, community and parent 
support, and administrative support predict greater job satisfaction (Baker, 2007). 
Research in other non-educational settings, such as among retail workers, where support 
is a strong predictor of job satisfaction (Babin & Boles, 1996) and among prison staff 
where support is a strong predictor of burnout (Garland, 2004), buttress the general 
finding that attitudinal support improves both job satisfaction and antecedents to job 
satisfaction. Although faculty tend to have more trust in the academic culture than in the 
administrative hierarchy (Volkwein & Malik, 1997), enjoy a high degree of autonomy, 
power, and self-governance (Hattie & Marsh, 1996; AAUP, 1994), there is not a strong 
theoretical argument to suggest that these attributes that set apart the faculty job would 
also alter the relationship between institutional support and job satisfaction because 
faculty are still affected by institutional attitudes in their work.  
Higher education institutions also provide support workers for the day-to-day 
work necessary for teaching, research, and the service or administrative duties that likely 
affect faculty job satisfaction. However, despite the ubiquity of support and 
administrative assistant positions in virtually all organizations there is scant research on 
this position in any field of research on how support workers might affect the job 
satisfaction of their colleagues at work. Grey literature argues that administrative 
assistants can provide substantial return on investment, boost productivity, and that 
experienced administrative staff can help new workers during the onboarding process 
acting as ‘reverse mentors’ (Duncan, 2011). Administrative assistants have also been 
found to be important technology trainers for less experienced workers (Vizer & Hanson, 
  82 
2009) and professional interrupters knowing the best times to interrupt to maximize 
productivity (Dabbish & Baker, 2003). Research confirms in the nursing industry that the 
introduction of administrative assistants improved the frontline productivity of nursing 
managers (Locke, Leach, Kitsell, & Griffith, 2011). A sizable stream of research in K-12 
education settings agrees that in general administrative support has a positive effect on 
job satisfaction among teachers (Erdogan, Kraimer, & Liden, 2004; Tickle, Chang, & 
Kim, 2011). Given the potential impact that support workers can have on the productivity 
and worklife of those they work with, it is also reasonable to suggest that institutional 
support in the form of staff workers can affect the job satisfaction of faculty members at 
universities. With both theoretical mechanisms in mind, this research hypothesizes that: 
 
H2a: Faculty who agree that their institution does what it can to help faculty who 
take on additional leadership roles (e.g. major committee assignments, 
department chairmanship) to sustain other aspects of their faculty work report 
higher global job satisfaction. 
 
Institutional Support and Job Satisfaction with Time Allocations 
In addition to its effects on global job satisfaction, institutional support can have 
an effect on how faculty are satisfied with time allocation. While not using a formal test, 
Ethington, Smart, & Zeltmann (1989) suggest that a university’s ability to both attract 
and support the research capabilities of faculty is crucial to their professional satisfaction 
and success. Rausch and colleagues (1989) also suggest a link between a lack of 
institutional support and a higher rate of voluntary turnover among faculty. These 
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hypotheses were later tested and confirmed by Olsen and colleagues (1995). The effect of 
support on job satisfaction is even stronger among faculty who work in distance learning 
settings given the extra need for support that distance creates (Mclean, 2006). Given that 
faculty satisfaction in the settings of research (Olsen et al, 1995) and teaching (Mclean, 
2006) is affected by the presence of institutional support, it is also probable that the 
presence of institutional support affects how faculty are satisfied with how their time is 
allocated, regardless of the type of university. Therefore, this research hypothesizes that: 
 
H2b: Faculty who agree that their institution does what it can to help faculty who 
take on additional leadership roles (e.g. major committee assignments, 
department chairmanship) to sustain other aspects of their faculty work report 
higher satisfaction with time allocations. 
 
DATA 
 Data for this study are drawn from the Faculty Job Satisfaction Survey by the 
Collaborative on Academic Careers in Higher Education (COACHE) at the Harvard 
Graduate School of Education and the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS). The COACHE survey has been sent to faculty from multiple institution types 
and has been conducted annually since 2005 and completed a major update in 2011. This 
research utilized five years of data following the update, from 2012-2016. A diverse set 
of four-year colleges and universities participate voluntarily. Composed mostly of Likert-
scale items, themes in the questionnaire examine nature of work, shared governance, 
policies, and satisfaction with various aspects of the job pertinent to this study.  
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 According to COACHE, institutional response rates vary by Carnegie 
Classification and by the proportion of tenured, pre-tenure, and non-tenure-track faculty 
in the eligible population at each university (COACHE, n.d.). Typical response rates by 
institution are in the 50% to 80% range, and most faculty complete the questionnaire in 
25 minutes with 90% who begin the questionnaire going on to complete it. For purposes 
of this research, I limited this sample to faculty at the assistant professor, associate 
professor, and professor rank, ultimately retaining about 5500 responses from faculty at 
55 institutions who had responded to the survey questions relevant for the analysis and to 
their position. Data on Carnegie classification in the sample was not available in this 
analysis, but as previously noted, the connections being studied are not materially 
affected by differences in Carnegie Classification. 
 Within the resulting data, the responses were mostly men (63%) and white (75%) 
with 44% being full professors, 36% associate professors, 20% assistant professors, and 
26% of the respondents reported working in an official administrative appointment. There 
were some apparent outliers, such as a few respondents with ages over 100 years. These 
responses were retained and unaltered in the analysis after sensitivity testing revealed that 
they did not have a material effect on the findings. Table 6 presents the summary 
statistics for these data. 
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 Table 6: Summary Statistics, Role Clarity and Job Satisfaction 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Global Job Satisfaction 0.00 0.78 -2.11 0.97 
Satisfaction with Time Allocations 0.00 0.85 -2.84 1.82 
Role Clarity for Faculty and Administration 3.02 1.13 1.00 5.00 
Institutional Support for Faculty Leaders 2.80 1.31 1.00 5.00 
Administrative Appointment 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Satisfaction - Number of Committees 3.41 0.94 1.00 5.00 
Satisfaction - Clerical Support 0.00 0.82 -1.87 1.59 
Assistant Professor 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Associate Professor 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Full Professor 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Annual Salary 6.55 2.06 1.00 9.00 
American Indian  or Alaskan Native 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
Asian, Asian American, Pacific Islander 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 
White (non-Hispanic) 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Black or African-American 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 
Hispanic or Latino 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
Other 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
Multi-racial 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Age 51.54 10.46 21.00 105.00 
Student Enrollment Size 4.22 0.99 1.00 5.00 
Public or Private 1.20 0.40 1.00 2.00 
Female 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Marital Status 2.09 0.63 1.00 4.00 
Balance Teaching, Research, and Service  3.23 1.29 1.00 5.00 
Satisfaction - Internal Funding Support  2.96 1.20 1.00 5.00 
Satisfaction - Number of Courses Taught 3.80 1.03 1.00 5.00 
Satisfaction - External Funding Expectations  3.25 1.01 1.00 5.00 
 
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS 
Measurement 
 This article uses two multiple-item scales to measure job satisfaction. One 
measures satisfaction with time spent on job facets unique to faculty work, and the other 
uses two global items of faculty job satisfaction. Measures for administrative role clarity, 
institutional support for faculty leaders, administrative leadership appointments, and 
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committee appointments were all single-item responses to survey questions. The measure 
for satisfaction with clerical support is created using multiple-items that relate to facets 
of clerical work that faculty come in contact with during their work. With the exception 
of administrative leadership appointments, which is a binary indicator variable, the rest 
of the focal variables are responses to Likert-scale items. Table 7 reports the various 
survey items used to measure the focal variables in the analysis. 
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Table 7: Survey Items of Focal Variables, Role Clarity and Job Satisfaction 
Variable  Survey Question Response Options 
Global job 
satisfaction 
All things considered, your department as a place 
to work - Please rate your level of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the following. 
 
1, Very dissatisfied; 2, Dissatisfied; 3, 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4, 
Satisfied; 5, Very satisfied 
Global job 
satisfaction 
All things considered, your institution as a place 
to work - Please rate your level of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the following. 
 
1, Very dissatisfied; 2, Dissatisfied; 3, 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4, 




Teaching - Please rate your level of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the portion of your time spent 
on the following. 
 
1, Very dissatisfied; 2, Dissatisfied; 3, 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4, 




Research - Please rate your level of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with the portion of your time spent 
on the following. 
 
1, Very dissatisfied; 2, Dissatisfied; 3, 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4, 




Service (e.g., department/program administration, 
faculty governance, committee work, 
advising/mentoring students, speaking to alumni 
or prospective students/parents) - Please rate your 
level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
portion of your time spent on the following. 
 
1, Very dissatisfied; 2, Dissatisfied; 3, 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4, 




Outreach (e.g., extension, community 
engagement, technology transfer, economic 
development, K-12 education) - Please rate your 
level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
portion of your time spent on the following. 
 
1, Very dissatisfied; 2, Dissatisfied; 3, 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4, 




Administrative tasks (e.g., creating and submitting 
reports, routine paperwork) - Please rate your 
level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
portion of your time spent on the following. 
 
1, Very dissatisfied; 2, Dissatisfied; 3, 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied; 4, 





My institution has clear rules about the various 
roles and authority of the faculty and 
administration - Please rate your level of 
agreement or disagreement with the following: 
1, Strongly disagree; 2, Somewhat 
disagree; 3, Neither agree nor disagree; 4, 







My institution does what it can to help faculty 
who take on additional leadership roles (e.g. 
major committee assignments, department 
chairmanship) to sustain other aspects of their 
faculty work. - Please rate your level of agreement 
or disagreement with the following statements. 
 
1, Strongly disagree; 2, Somewhat 
disagree; 3, Neither agree nor disagree; 4, 




 To obtain factor loadings for three theoretical factor variables, confirmatory factor 
analysis with varimax rotation was conducted. Each of the survey questions loaded 
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strongly on their respective factor. Chronbach's alpha scores for the items used to create 
the factor variables global job satisfaction, satisfaction with time allocations, and clerical 
satisfaction were .75, .75, and .70 respectively, which are all above the common rule of 
thumb of .70. To determine the possibility of multi-level variation across individuals 
(level 1) and institutions (level 2) , intercept only or ‘unconditional’ models for each of 
the dependent variables of interest were run, which yielded intraclass correlations of .06 
for the global job satisfaction variable and .03 for the time allocation satisfaction 
variable. Since 6% and 3% of the total variation for the two dependent variables comes 
from the institutional level, there is potential for multi-level modeling. Given that the 
factor variables were found to be reliable and all focal variables are normally distributed 
the set of variables were suitable for analysis using ordinary least squares regression. 
 The resulting variables were analyzed using both multi-level modeling with 
maximum likelihood estimation and ordinary-least-squares regressions with 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Multi-level models clustered on institution to 
account for differences by institution. Likelihood ratio tests post-estimation revealed the 
multi-level models as better fits to the data and thus only findings of the multi-level 
models are reported, though findings from ordinary least squared regression were very 
similar. An early version of the analysis included fixed effects for years, but these were 
removed for later analyses due to high levels of collinearity across years, which also 
indicate low variation across years. Post-estimation tests also indicate low levels of multi-
collinearity among the variables. Finally, additional tests were also conducted including 
the Harman’s one-factor test to identify issues with common source bias (George & 
Pandey, 2017). For further information on the preceding analyses, see Appendix C. 
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 To begin the model building process, a first model for each dependent variable 
only included the first focal variable. Subsequent models gradually added focal variables 
and finally control variables in a step-wise fashion until all variables were present for the 
final models. Control variables include race/ethnicity, gender, marital status, salary, 
tenure-track rank, and age as these have all been found to correlate with job satisfaction 
(see Bozeman & Gaughan, 2011; Hagedorn, 2000). In addition, control variables 
measuring satisfaction with external funding expectations and internal funding support, 
ability to balance teaching, research, and service, and public or private control were 
included. Figure 5 is a visual representation of the empirical models and the hypothesized 
connection between the variables, in which the hypotheses with subscript a represent the 
relationships between the independent variables and global job satisfaction and 
hypotheses with subscript b represent the relationships between the independent variables 
and satisfaction with time allocations. 
Figure 5: Empirical Model and Summary of Hypotheses 
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Results 
 Tables 8 and 9 present the findings of the analysis. All of the hypotheses were 
supported with statistically significant outcomes at the p<.01 value with the variables role 
clarity for faculty and administration and institutional support for faculty leaders both 
having statistically significant and positive effects on global job satisfaction (p<.01) and 
satisfaction with time allocations (p<.01) respectively. Among the control variables, 
contrary to previous studies gender did not have a statistically significant effect on 
satisfaction with time allocations or global job satisfaction. Also surprisingly, salary did 
not have a statistically significant effect on global job satisfaction but had a significant 
effect on satisfaction with time allocations (p<.05). University size had a statistically 
significant and negative effect on both global satisfaction (p<.05) but no significant 
effect on satisfaction with time allocations. Finally, working in a private university (vs. a 
public university) had a statistically significant and positive effect on global job 
satisfaction (p<.10) but had a statistically significant and negative effect on satisfaction 
with time allocations (p<.01).   
  91 
Table 8: Multi-level Models predicting Global Job Satisfaction 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
    
Role Clarity for Faculty and Administration 0.27*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Institutional Support for Faculty Leaders  0.25*** 0.13*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Administrative Leadership Appointments   0.13*** 
   (0.02) 
Number of Committees Satisfaction   0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Assistant Professor   0.02 
   (0.03) 
Associate Professor   -0.01 
   (0.02) 
Salary   0.01 
   (0.01) 
Clerical Satisfaction   0.11*** 
   (0.01) 
Number of Courses Taught Satisfaction   0.09*** 
   (0.01) 
Ext. Funding Expectations Satisfaction   0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Age   0.00 
   (0.00) 
Enrollment   -0.05** 
   (0.02) 
Private Control (vs. Public)   0.08* 
   (0.04) 
Female   0.02 
   (0.02) 
Marital Status   -0.00 
   (0.01) 
Time Balance Ability   0.05*** 
   (0.01) 
Institutional Grant Support Satisfaction   0.08*** 
   (0.01) 
Native American   -0.08 
   (0.10) 
Asian   -0.16*** 
   (0.03) 
Black   -0.06 
   (0.04) 
Hispanic   -0.07* 
   (0.04) 
Other Race   -0.16* 
   (0.10) 
Multiracial   0.01 
   (0.07) 
Constant -0.83*** -1.184*** -1.68*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) 
Observations 6,036 6,036 5,590 
Number of groups 56 56 55 
Notes: Base case for faculty rank is full professor, and for race is White. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  92 
Table 9: Multi-level Models Predicting Satisfaction with Time Allocations 
VARIABLES (4) (5) (6) 
    
Role Clarity for Faculty and Administration 0.23*** 0.10*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Institutional Support for Faculty Leaders  0.31*** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Administrative Leadership Appointments   0.03 
   (0.02) 
Number of Committees Satisfaction   0.23*** 
   (0.01) 
Assistant Professor   0.06* 
   (0.03) 
Associate Professor   -0.00 
   (0.02) 
Salary   0.01** 
   (0.010) 
Clerical Satisfaction   0.08*** 
   (0.01) 
Number of Courses Taught Satisfaction   0.14*** 
   (0.01) 
Ext. Funding Expectations Satisfaction   0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Age   0.01*** 
   (0.00) 
Enrollment   -0.02 
   (0.01) 
Private Control (vs. Public)   -0.08*** 
   (0.03) 
Female   -0.02 
   (0.02) 
Marital Status   0.01 
   (0.01) 
Time Balance Ability   0.18*** 
   (0.01) 
Institutional Grant Support Satisfaction   0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Native American   0.02 
   (0.10) 
Asian   0.04 
   (0.03) 
Black   0.13*** 
   (0.04) 
Hispanic   0.01 
   (0.04) 
Other Race   -0.05 
   (0.10) 
Multiracial   -0.02 
   (0.06) 
Constant -0.72*** -1.16*** -2.78*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.10) 
Observations 6,159 6,159 5,702 
Number of groups 56 56 55 
Notes: Base case for faculty rank is full professor, and for race is White. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Evidence from the empirical analyses support the hypotheses that both role clarity 
for faculty and administrators and institutional support for faculty leaders affect both 
global job satisfaction and satisfaction with time allocations of university faculty. Like 
any research, this has its weaknesses. Common source and common method bias stand 
out as most of the data in the analyses comes from the COACHE surveys. These issues 
are abetted by the large size of the sample, the use of various waves of the survey, and the 
strength of the relationships. Furthermore, some of the focal variables are single-item 
measures reducing their reliability. Like much of the red tape research, which uses a 
single-item measure, this paper uses a single-item to measure the rule clarity about 
administrative roles and the presence of institutional support for faculty leaders. Once 
again, however, the strength of the correlations in the findings helps alleviate this concern 
as measurement error often results in weaker findings.   
Research suggests that determinants of faculty job satisfaction are alike but also 
do differ in some ways from those of other professional workers (Bozeman & Gaughan, 
2011). University faculty are unique among professional workers across sectors because 
academic institutions have long staved off the institutional logic of corporatism 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Rindova, 2008; Kraatz, Ventresca, & Deng, 2010; Birnbaum, 
2000) and enjoy a high degree of autonomy, power, and self-governance (Hattie & 
Marsh, 1996; AAUP, 1994). The unique management structure of academic institutions 
includes faculty roles as part-time administrators. This situation motivated the focus of 
the paper, as it examines how aspects of that role affect their job satisfaction. In 
imagining a world where universities adhere to the corporate logic, contemporary faculty 
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job duties might well be split among three entirely separate job titles. Evidence suggests 
that this might already be happening (Macfarlane, 2011). If traditional universities begin 
to use full-time, professional administrators in positions that were once the domain of 
researcher/teachers, then role clarity will become less of a problem as full-time 
administrators and managers do not have to question how teaching and research fall into 
their work duties.    
Though service and administration work often become less important than 
research and teaching in the mind and focus of faculty members, as a specific endeavor 
university leadership is becoming a priority for theory and practice (Crow & Dabars, 
2015). A key aspect of university leadership relevant to society, business, and public 
policy is knowledge management. As Drucker (1997) sagely observed and predicted, 
management originated 150 years ago in an attempt to organize the production of things 
and the next frontier would be refining the management of knowledge resources. As we 
now sit decades into the information age, the development of theory and practice in 
management of knowledge resources, of which universities play a central role, is of 
paramount importance.  
To the topic at hand the question now becomes, how does the need to improve 
knowledge management apply to issues of university administration and faculty job 
satisfaction? The answer lies in the realization that the management of knowledge in the 
university setting lies at the hand of university administration and the intertwined and 
participatory role that faculty play in knowledge production, knowledge management, 
and shared governance in university leadership. The gist of this research is the idea that if 
faculty are not clear about their role in administration or not supported by the 
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administration, then job satisfaction and potentially productivity, knowledge creation, and 
knowledge management will suffer. This research is part of the refinement of university 
management with the goal being able to understand better the human capital responsible 
for knowledge resources and management. 
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Requested Administrative Support 4.48*** 
 (0.23) 






Robust standard errors in parentheses 




Notes: As expected, both the request for administrative support, and department 
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Figure A1: Histogram of Total Grant Submissions 
 
 
Notes: In figure A1 the distribution of grant submissions is truncated at zero as expected.  
This count data has some zero values, but not an overwhelming amount.  Inspection of 
the summary statistics (see Table 1) suggest that a negative binomial model would be a 


















0 50 100 150 200
grant_sbmt_tot
  118 
Table A2: Different Model Types Predicting Total Grant Submissions 
 
 M2 M2a M2b 
VARIABLES NB OLS NB: No Outliers 
Received Admin. Sup. -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 
 (0.08) (0.92) (0.07) 
Administrative Stress -0.04 -0.26 -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.28) (0.03) 
# Courses Taught 0.02 -0.11 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.36) (0.02) 
# Committees 0.06*** 0.61** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.26) (0.01) 
5-yr Pub. Avg 0.03*** 0.33 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.22) (0.00) 
Assoc. Prof. -0.14** -1.20* -0.13** 
 (0.07) (0.65) (0.06) 
Full Prof.  -0.20*** -1.77** -0.16*** 
 (0.06) (0.77) (0.06) 
University Reputation 0.00 0.16 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.40) (0.03) 
Female -0.14*** -1.19** -0.08* 
 (0.05) (0.56) (0.05) 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd -0.01*** -0.05*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 0.10*** 1.04*** 0.09*** 
 (0.01) (0.24) (0.01) 
Chemistry 0.02 -0.53 0.01 
 (0.08) (1.06) (0.08) 
Computer Science 0.11 0.72 -0.20** 
 (0.08) (0.79) (0.08) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.34*** 2.37** 0.03 
 (0.08) (1.14) (0.08) 
Electrical Engineering 0.03 -0.14 -0.18** 
 (0.09) (0.81) (0.08) 
Physics -0.09 -0.84 -0.24*** 
 (0.08) (1.40) (0.08) 
South Asian 0.16 1.05 0.27*** 
 (0.11) (0.99) (0.10) 
Other Asian 0.29*** 2.39** 0.29*** 
 (0.08) (1.02) (0.07) 
African American 0.18 2.22 0.12 
 (0.22) (1.42) (0.21) 
Hispanic 0.29** 1.58 -0.06 
 (0.15) (2.59) (0.14) 
Native American -0.13 -1.78 -0.17 
 (0.33) (3.33) (0.29) 
Race Other -0.01 -0.56 0.19 
 (0.18) (1.45) (0.19) 
Constant 1.56*** 3.37* 1.60*** 
 (0.15) (1.87) (0.15) 
    
Observations 1,417 1,417 1,410 
R-squared  0.10  
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 ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Biology is the base discipline and white is the base 
race/ethnicity. NB = Negative Binomial.  
 
Notes to Table A2: Removal of potential outliers (bolded values in Table A3), does not 
appear to materially affect the results between model 2 and model 2b. 
 
 
























Post-estimation Tests for Grant Submission Models 
 
Model 2:  
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 2 reveal the negative binomial a better fit to the 
data than the Poisson model.  
o Chi Squared = 5767.94 (p<0.01) 
 
Model 2b: 
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 2b reveal the negative binomial a better fit to the 
data than the Poisson model.  
o Chi Squared = 1693.57 (p<0.01) 
 
  120 
 
Table A4: Multicollinearity Post-estimation of Model 2a Results 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
Full Prof.  1.83 0.55 
Earth & Atmosphere  1.77 0.57 
Chemistry 1.76 0.57 
Physics 1.73 0.58 
Computer Science 1.69 0.59 
Electrical Engineering 1.67 0.60 
Assoc. Prof. 1.65 0.61 
# Committees 1.28 0.78 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 1.23 0.81 
5-yr Pub. Avg 1.18 0.84 
Administrative Stress 1.15 0.87 
# Courses Taught 1.14 0.88 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd 1.09 0.92 
University Reputation 1.07 0.93 
South Asian 1.06 0.95 
Other Asian 1.06 0.95 
Received Admin. Sup. 1.06 0.95 
Female 1.04 0.96 
Native American 1.03 0.97 
Hispanic 1.03 0.97 
African American 1.03 0.97 
Race Other 1.02 0.99 
 
Notes to Table A4: Variables have low levels of multi-collinearity. 
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Notes: In figure A2 the distribution of total grant awards is truncated at zero as expected.  
This count data has some zero values, but not an overwhelming amount.  Inspection of 
the summary statistics (see Table 1) suggest that a negative binomial model would be a 
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Table A5: Different Model Types Predicting Total Grant Awards 
 
 M3 M3a M3b 
VARIABLES NB OLS No Outliers NB 
Received Admin. Sup. -0.21** -0.59 -0.23** 
 (0.10) (0.53) (0.10) 
Administrative Stress -0.02 -0.09 -0.09** 
 (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) 
# Courses Taught 0.04 0.03 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.22) (0.03) 
# Committees 0.03** 0.17 0.04** 
 (0.02) (0.17) (0.02) 
5-yr Pub. Avg 0.02*** 0.13 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.12) (0.01) 
Assoc. Prof. 0.13 0.17 0.15* 
 (0.09) (0.30) (0.09) 
Full Prof.  0.30*** 0.73 0.35*** 
 (0.08) (0.54) (0.08) 
University Reputation 0.06 0.33 -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.23) (0.04) 
Female -0.09 -0.33 -0.08 
 (0.06) (0.32) (0.06) 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd 0.01** 0.02** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 0.13*** 0.56*** 0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) 
Chemistry -0.38*** -1.62*** -0.44*** 
 (0.11) (0.62) (0.11) 
Computer Science -0.08 -0.41 -0.37*** 
 (0.11) (0.45) (0.11) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.39*** 1.47* 0.15 
 (0.10) (0.80) (0.11) 
Electrical Engineering -0.17 -0.66 -0.32*** 
 (0.12) (0.49) (0.12) 
Physics -0.16 -0.66 -0.37*** 
 (0.11) (0.82) (0.12) 
South Asian 0.16 0.44 0.27* 
 (0.14) (0.53) (0.14) 
Other Asian -0.05 0.02 -0.02 
 (0.11) (0.38) (0.11) 
African American 0.15 0.80 0.15 
 (0.29) (0.80) (0.29) 
Hispanic 0.27 0.37 0.23 
 (0.18) (0.81) (0.18) 
Native American 0.23 0.44 0.29 
 (0.42) (2.23) (0.40) 
Race Other 0.02 0.05 -0.00 
 (0.25) (0.78) (0.27) 
Constant 0.20 -0.46 0.29 
 (0.20) (1.08) (0.20) 
    
Observations 1,218 1,218 1,215 
R-squared  0.09  
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***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. Biology is the base discipline and white is the base 
race/ethnicity. NB = Negative Binomial.  
 
Notes to Table A5: Removal of potential outliers (bolded values in Table A6), does not 
appear to materially affect the results between model 3 and model 3b. An attempted zero-
inflated negative binomial model did not converge. 
 
 






















Post-estimation Tests for Grant Awards Models 
 
Model 3:  
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 2 reveal the negative binomial a better fit to the 
data than a Poisson model.  
o Chi Squared = 2350.38 (p<0.01) 
 
Model 3b: 
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 2b reveal the negative binomial a better fit to the 
data than a Poisson model.  
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Table A7: Multicollinearity Post-estimation of Model 3a Results 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
Earth & Atmosphere  1.89 0.53 
Chemistry 1.87 0.54 
Computer Science 1.81 0.55 
Electrical Engineering 1.81 0.55 
Full Prof.  1.80 0.55 
Physics 1.79 0.56 
Assoc. Prof. 1.61 0.62 
# Committees 1.29 0.78 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 1.27 0.79 
5-yr Pub. Avg 1.20 0.84 
Administrative Stress 1.16 0.86 
# Courses Taught 1.13 0.88 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd 1.09 0.92 
University Reputation 1.08 0.93 
South Asian 1.07 0.94 
Other Asian 1.06 0.94 
Received Admin. Sup. 1.06 0.94 
Female 1.05 0.96 
Hispanic 1.03 0.97 
Native American 1.03 0.97 
African American 1.03 0.97 
Race Other 1.02 0.98 
 
 
Notes to Table A7: Variables have low levels of multi-collinearity. 
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Notes: In figure A3 the distribution of grant success rates is mostly bounded at 0 and 1 
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Table A8: Different Models Predicting Grant Success Rate 
 
 M4 M4a 
VARIABLES OLS With Outliers 
Received Admin. Sup. -0.06** -0.07*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Administrative Stress 0.01 0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
# Courses Taught -0.02* -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
# Committees -0.01*** -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
5-yr Pub. Avg 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Assoc. Prof. 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
Full Prof.  0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
University Reputation 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.00 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Chemistry -0.08*** -0.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Computer Science -0.03 -0.06* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.04 0.052* 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Electrical Engineering 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
Physics 0.03 -0.01 
 (0.03) (0.03) 
South Asian -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Other Asian -0.11*** -0.12*** 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
African American -0.04 -0.02 
 (0.06) (0.07) 
Hispanic 0.06 0.11* 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Native American -0.025 0.39 
 (0.04) (0.31) 
Race Other -0.09 -0.11* 
 (0.07) (0.06) 
Constant 0.33*** 0.32*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
   
Observations 1,172 1,174 
R-squared 0.19 0.19 
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Notes: Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10.  Biology is the base discipline and white is 
the base race/ethnicity. OLS = Ordinary Least Squares. 
Notes to Table A8: Insertion of outliers (bolded values in Table A9), does not appear to 
materially affect the results between model 4 and model 4a. The final model (model 4) 
did not include outliers because success rates cannot be larger than 1. 
 
 
Table A9: Sample of Grant Awards Data (Potential Outliers Bolded) 
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Table A10: Multicollinearity Post-estimation of Model 4 Results 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
Chemistry 1.91 0.52 
Earth & Atmosphere  1.90 0.53 
Electrical Engineering 1.84 0.54 
Computer Science 1.84 0.54 
Physics 1.81 0.55 
Full Prof.  1.79 0.56 
Assoc. Prof. 1.60 0.63 
# Committees 1.28 0.78 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 1.26 0.79 
5-yr Pub. Avg 1.20 0.84 
Administrative Stress 1.15 0.87 
# Courses Taught 1.13 0.89 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd 1.10 0.91 
University Reputation 1.08 0.92 
South Asian 1.07 0.93 
Other Asian 1.07 0.94 
Received Admin. Sup. 1.06 0.94 
Female 1.05 0.96 
Hispanic 1.03 0.97 
Native American 1.03 0.97 
African American 1.03 0.97 
Race Other 1.02 0.98 
 
Notes to Table A10: Variables have low levels of multi-collinearity. 
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Figure A4: Histogram of Total Grant Dollars 
 
Notes: In figure A4 the distribution of total grant dollars is truncated at zero as expected.  
This count data has many zero values making it a potential candidate for zero-inflated 
models.  Inspection of the summary statistics (see Table 1) suggest that a negative 
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Table A11: Different Model Types Predicting Total Grant Dollars 
 
 M5 M5a M5b M5c 
VARIABLES NB OLS ZINB No Outliers NB 
Received Admin. Sup. 0.62*** 1.39 0.68*** 0.14 
 (0.13) (0.88) (0.14) (0.13) 
Administrative Stress 0.05 -0.00 0.05 0.10** 
 (0.05) (0.25) (0.06) (0.05) 
# Courses Taught -0.19*** -0.40** -0.17*** -0.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.04) 
# Committees -0.03 -0.07 -0.03 -0.03* 
 (0.02) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) 
5-yr Pub. Avg -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Assoc. Prof. 0.48*** 1.09** 0.50*** 0.34*** 
 (0.13) (0.47) (0.13) (0.12) 
Full Prof.  0.99*** 1.78*** 1.02*** 0.70*** 
 (0.12) (0.51) (0.12) (0.14) 
University Reputation 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.18*** 
 (0.06) (0.21) (0.06) (0.05) 
Female -0.15* -0.52 -0.12 -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.42) (0.09) (0.08) 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd 0.01*** 0.02 0.01*** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 0.14*** 0.27*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 
 (0.02) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) 
Chemistry -0.18 -0.48 -0.16 -0.12 
 (0.15) (0.52) (0.16) (0.14) 
Computer Science 0.00 -0.03 0.10 0.09 
 (0.16) (0.54) (0.17) (0.14) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.04 0.19 0.08 -0.09 
 (0.15) (0.71) (0.16) (0.14) 
Electrical Engineering 0.09 0.75 0.07 -0.06 
 (0.17) (0.93) (0.18) (0.15) 
Physics 0.29** 0.85 0.37** 0.21 
 (0.15) (0.84) (0.16) (0.14) 
South Asian 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.30* 
 (0.19) (0.75) (0.20) (0.1) 
Other Asian -0.60*** -0.99*** -0.62*** -0.48*** 
 (0.17) (0.29) (0.18) (0.15) 
African American 0.46 0.24 0.53 0.51 
 (0.40) (0.65) (0.42) (0.36) 
Hispanic -0.11 -0.00 -0.11 0.19 
 (0.26) (0.81) (0.27) (0.23) 
Native American 0.99* 1.32 1.05* 0.93* 
 (0.56) (1.16) (0.59) (0.50) 
Race Other 2.47*** 6.11 2.716*** -0.09 
 (0.31) (6.63) (0.33) (0.29) 
Constant -0.24 1.437 -0.33 -0.56** 
 (0.28) (1.04) (0.30) (0.25) 
Observations 1,275 1,275 1,114 1,270 
R-squared  0.05   
Zero Inflation Predictor     
Grant Awards Total   -0.02  
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   (1.17)  
Constant   -23.55  
   (6.72)  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; $ in millions.  Biology is the base discipline and white is 
the base race/ethnicity. NB = Negative Binomial, OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, ZINB 
= Zero inflated negative binomial. Number of grant awards used to predict zero values in 
largest grant in dollars.  
 
 
Notes to Table A11: Removal of potential outliers (bolded values in Table A12), does 
appear to materially affect the results between model 5 and model 5c. However, there is 
no reason to think these outliers are a result of input errors. 
 
 
Table A12: Sample of Total Grant Dollars (Potential Outliers Bolded) 
 




















Post-estimation Tests for Total Grant Dollars Models 
 
Model 5:  
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 5 reveal the negative binomial a better fit to the 
data than a Poisson model.  
o Chi Squared = 3943.31 (p<0.01) 
 
Model 5b: 
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 The Vuong test of Model 5b reveal the negative binomial a better fit to the data 
than a zero-inflated negative binomial model.  
o Z Score = -2.01 (p = 0.98) 
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 5b reveal the zero-inflated negative binomial a 
better fit to the data than a zero-inflated Poisson model.  
o Chi Squared = 3351.98 (p<0.01) 
 
Model 5c:  
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 5 reveal the negative binomial a better fit to the 
data than a Poisson model.  
o Chi Squared = 1286.17 (p<0.01) 
 
 
Table A13: Multicollinearity Post-estimation of Model 5a Results 
 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
Earth & Atmosphere  1.84 0.54 
Chemistry 1.81 0.55 
Full Prof.  1.80 0.55 
Physics 1.79 0.56 
Electrical Engineering 1.73 0.58 
Computer Science 1.71 0.58 
Assoc. Prof. 1.61 0.62 
# Committees 1.28 0.78 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 1.24 0.81 
5-yr Pub. Avg 1.18 0.85 
Administrative Stress 1.16 0.86 
# Courses Taught 1.14 0.88 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd 1.09 0.92 
University Reputation 1.08 0.93 
Received Admin. Sup. 1.06 0.94 
South Asian 1.06 0.94 
Other Asian 1.06 0.95 
Female 1.05 0.95 
Native American 1.03 0.97 
Hispanic 1.03 0.97 
African American 1.03 0.97 
Race Other 1.02 0.98 
 
Notes to Table A13: Variables have low levels of multi-collinearity. 
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Figure A5: Histogram of Largest Grant in Dollars 
 
 
Notes: In figure A5 the distribution of largest grant in dollars is truncated at zero as 
expected.  This count data has many zero values making it a potential candidate for zero-
inflated models.  Inspection of the summary statistics (see Table 1) suggest that a 
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Table A14: Different Model Types Predicting Largest Grant in Dollars 
 
 M6 M6a M6b M6c M6d 
VARIABLES ZINB OLS NB No Outliers 
ZINB 
No Outliers NB 
Received Admin. 
Sup. 
1.07*** 1.62* 0.93*** 0.54*** 0.49*** 
 (0.14) (0.93) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Administrative 
Stress 
0.17*** 0.16 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.06) (0.19) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
# Courses Taught -0.19*** -0.21 -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
# Committees -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.18) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
5-yr Pub. Avg -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Assoc. Prof. 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.17 0.16 
 (0.14) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
Full Prof.  0.84*** 1.35*** 0.88*** 0.56*** 0.58*** 
 (0.13) (0.42) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
University 
Reputation 
-0.03 -0.15 -0.01 0.09 0.08 
 (0.07) (0.30) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female 0.00 -0.37 -0.06 0.03 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.43) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Prob. First Sub. 
Awrdd 
0.01*** 0.03 0.01*** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd 
Proj. 
0.09*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Chemistry -0.38** -1.28 -0.43*** -0.02 -0.13 
 (0.16) (1.05) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) 
Computer Science -0.43*** -1.27 -0.50*** -0.060 -0.20 
 (0.17) (1.03) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) 
Earth & Atmosphere -0.37** -0.79 -0.38*** -0.22 -0.33** 
 (0.16) (1.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
Electrical 
Engineering 
-0.39** -0.97 -0.40** -0.13 -0.16 
 (0.18) (0.93) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) 
Physics -0.11 -0.39 -0.02 0.18 0.03 
 (0.16) (1.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
South Asian 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.17 
 (0.21) (0.40) (0.20) (0.19) (0.17) 
Other Asian -0.49*** -0.54*** -0.50*** -0.40** -0.39** 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) 
African American 0.00 -0.48 0.00 0.11 0.09 
 (0.44) (0.57) (0.44) (0.39) (0.38) 
Hispanic -0.12 -0.22 -0.12 0.04 0.08 
 (0.27) (0.66) (0.27) (0.24) (0.23) 
Native American 2.89*** 6.28 2.64*** 2.57*** 2.44*** 
 (0.52) (4.41) (0.49) (0.44) (0.42) 
Race Other -0.38 -0.98** -0.61* -0.26 -0.47 
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 (0.39) (0.45) (0.37) (0.34) (0.33) 
Constant -0.18 1.328 -0.24 -0.54** -0.42* 
 (0.29) (1.03) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24) 
Observations 1,136 1,298 1,298 1,133 1,294 
R-squared  0.03    
Zero Inflation 
Predictor 
     
Grant Awards Total -0.0   -0.01  
 (1.71)   (689.50)  
Constant -25.51   -23.09  
 (13.42)   (4.36)  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; $ in millions.  Biology is the base discipline and white is 
the base race/ethnicity. NB = Negative Binomial, OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, ZINB 
= Zero inflated negative binomial. Number of grant awards used to predict zero values in 
largest grant in dollars.  
 
Notes to Table A14: Removal of potential outliers (bolded values in Table A15), does 
not appear to materially affect the results between model 6 and model 6c.  
 
 
Table A15: Sample of Largest Grant in Dollars (Potential Outliers Bolded) 
 



















Post-estimation Tests for Largest Grant Models 
 
Model 6:  
 The Vuong test of Model 6 reveal the zero-inflated negative binomial a better fit 
to the data than a negative binomial model (M6b).  
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o Z Score = 2.68  (p = 0.00) 
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 6 reveal the zero-inflated negative binomial a 
better fit to the data than a zero-inflated Poisson model.  
o Chi Squared = 2681.74 (p<0.01) 
 
Model 6d:  
 The Vuong test of Model 6 reveal the negative binomial a better fit to the data 
than a negative zero-inflated binomial model.  
o Z Score = -3.85  (p = 0.99) 
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 6b reveal the zero-inflated negative binomial a 
better fit to the data than a zero-inflated Poisson model.  
o Chi Squared = 735.76 (p<0.01) 
 
 
Table A16: Multicollinearity Post-estimation of Model 6a Results 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
Earth & Atmosphere  1.86 0.54 
Chemistry 1.82 0.55 
Full Prof.  1.81 0.55 
Physics 1.80 0.56 
Electrical Engineering 1.73 0.58 
Computer Science 1.73 0.58 
Assoc. Prof. 1.62 0.62 
# Committees 1.28 0.78 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 1.25 0.80 
5-yr Pub. Avg 1.19 0.84 
Administrative Stress 1.17 0.86 
# Courses Taught 1.14 0.88 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd 1.09 0.92 
University Reputation 1.08 0.93 
Received Admin. Sup. 1.06 0.94 
South Asian 1.06 0.94 
Other Asian 1.05 0.95 
Female 1.05 0.95 
Native American 1.03 0.97 
Hispanic 1.03 0.97 
African American 1.03 0.97 
Race Other 1.02 0.98 
 
Notes to Table A16: Variables have low levels of multi-collinearity. 
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Post-Estimation Tests of Instrumental Variables 
Because post-estimation tests for instrumental variables in negative binomial regressions 
do not exist, OLS regressions were run for all of the dependent variables in order to run 
post-estimation tests.  The first-stage test examines whether the instrumental variables are 
correlated with the received administrative support variable and uncorrelated with the 
error term. Table 2 shows that the instruments have strong explanatory power in each of 
the models. The endogeneity test examines whether the received administrative support 
variable is endogenous with the grant outcomes variables. The Durbin chi-squared test 
reveal that only the success rate variable is empirically endogenous below the p=.05 rule 
of thumb. However, the submissions, awards, total dollars, and largest dollars models 
for these tests are mispecified as OLS models, so results of these tests can be disregarded.   
Furthermore, there is a strong theoretical argument that administrative support is 
endogenous with grant outcomes, providing support for the need to correct for the reverse 
causality issue.  Finally, the test for overidentifying restrictions tests both whether the 
instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the structural error term and whether the 
equation as hand is specified correctly.  Results from these tests reveal that each of the 
models was specified correctly and that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term in each model. 
 
Table A17: Instrumental Variable Post-Estimation Tests 
  M2a M3a M4 M5a M6a 
 Ideal Submissions Awards Success Rate Total $ Largest $ 
First Stage Test       
F Statistic F>10 393.27 393.27 393.27 393.27 393.27 
       
Endogeneity Test       
Chi. Sq.  0.60 0.00 5.58 2.10 1.53 
P Value P<0.05 0.44 0.96 0.02 0.15 0.22 
       
Overidentifying 
Restrictions       
Chi. Sq.  0.10 0.02 2.09 0.00 0.07 
P Value P>0.05 0.75 0.89 0.15 0.96 0.79 
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Table A18: Summary Statistics of PI and Co-PI Grant Outcomes 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PI Grant Submissions 5.11 8.68 0 180 
PI Grant Success Rate 0.43 0.35 0 1 
PI Grant Awards 2.27 5.75 0 159 
Co-PI Grant Submissions 2.61 4.42 0 80 
Co-PI Grant Success Rate 0.40 0.38 0 1 
Co-PI Grant Awards 1.10 2.19 0 40 
 
Notes: Total grant submissions, awards, and success rates were split up between principal 
investigators and co-principal investigators. Futher analyses of the models when these 
outcomes were split up between PI’s and Co-PI’s (Tables A19 and A20) reveal that the 
statistically significant relationships when combined were mostly because of grant 
activity as principal investigator. 
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Table A19: PI Grant Outcomes 
 Submissions Awards Success Rate 
VARIABLES NB ZINB OLS 
Received Admin. Sup. 0.03 -0.24** -0.07** 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) 
Administrative Stress -0.05 -0.05 0.02** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) 
# Courses Taught 0.03 0.07** -0.02* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
# Committees 0.03** 0.01 -0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) 
5-yr Pub. Avg 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Assoc. Prof. -0.20*** 0.09 0.08*** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.02) 
Full Prof.  -0.15** 0.41*** 0.16*** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) 
University Reputation -0.02 0.02 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 
Female -0.16*** -0.14** -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.02) 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd -0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Chemistry -0.08 -0.40*** -0.09*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.03) 
Computer Science -0.21** -0.35*** -0.06* 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.03) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.22** 0.35*** 0.05 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.03) 
Electrical Engineering -0.25** -0.31** -0.02 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.03) 
Physics -0.32*** -0.39*** -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.03) 
South Asian 0.27** 0.19 -0.00 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.04) 
Other Asian 0.39*** -0.05 -0.12*** 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.03) 
African American 0.12 0.08 0.01 
 (0.25) (0.31) (0.07) 
Hispanic 0.27 0.17 0.11* 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.06) 
Native American -0.11 0.54 0.08 
 (0.37) (0.38) (0.13) 
Race Other -0.12 -0.07 -0.11* 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.06) 
Constant 1.433*** 0.12 0.32*** 
 (0.171) (0.21) (0.06) 
Observations 1,429 1,344 1,247 
R-squared   0.19 
Zero Inflation Predictor    
Grant Awards Total  -5.75***  
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  (1.08)  
Constant  4.17***  
  (1.01)  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; $ in millions.  Biology is the base discipline and white is 
the base race/ethnicity. NB = Negative Binomial, OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, ZINB 
= Zero inflated negative binomial. Number of grant awards used to predict zero values in 
largest grant in dollars.  
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Table A20: Co-PI Grant Outcomes 
 Submissions Awards Success Rate 
VARIABLES NB ZINB OLS 
Received Admin. Sup. -0.11 -0.20 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.04) 
Administrative Stress -0.01 0.00 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) 
# Courses Taught -0.01 -0.06* -0.03** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) 
# Committees 0.10*** 0.05*** -0.01** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
5-yr Pub. Avg 0.03*** 0.02*** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Assoc. Prof. -0.05 0.21** 0.06* 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.03) 
Full Prof.  -0.30*** 0.15 0.08** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.03) 
University Reputation 0.03 0.14*** 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) 
Female -0.10 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) 
Prob. First Sub. Awrdd -0.01*** 0.00 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
# Doc. Stu. Fndd Proj. 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) 
Chemistry 0.24** -0.26* -0.05 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.04) 
Computer Science 0.72*** 0.37*** 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.05) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.62*** 0.31** 0.02 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.04) 
Electrical Engineering 0.62*** 0.14 -0.02 
 (0.12) (0.15) (0.05) 
Physics 0.38*** 0.21 0.07* 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.04) 
South Asian -0.06 -0.13 -0.02 
 (0.14) (0.17) (0.05) 
Other Asian 0.10 -0.26* -0.06 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.04) 
African American 0.38 0.12 -0.10 
 (0.28) (0.35) (0.09) 
Hispanic 0.33* 0.18 0.06 
 (0.19) (0.21) (0.07) 
Native American -0.25 0.05 0.17 
 (0.42) (0.47) (0.16) 
Race Other -0.01 0.24 -0.04 
 (0.24) (0.28) (0.10) 
Constant -0.09 -0.65*** 0.36*** 
 (0.20) (0.25) (0.08) 
Observations 1,424 1,266 1,014 
R-squared   0.08 
Zero Inflation Predictor    
Grant Awards Total  -22.83  
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  (3.61)  
Constant  21.37  
  (3.61)  
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10; $ in millions.  Biology is the base discipline and white is 
the base race/ethnicity. NB = Negative Binomial, OLS = Ordinary Least Squares, ZINB 
= Zero inflated negative binomial. Number of grant awards used to predict zero values in 
largest grant in dollars.  
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Table A21: Correlations 
| Submissions Awards 
Success 











s 1        
Awards 0.84 1       
Success 
Rate -0.10 0.22 1      
Grant $ 
Tot. 0.12 0.15 0.13 1     
Grant $ 
Large. 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.62 1    
Received 
Admin.  -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.03 1   
Requested 
Admin. 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.05 0.07 0.70 1  
Deprt. 
Reputation 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.00 1 
Admin. Str. 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 
# Courses  -0.01 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 
# 
Committee
s 0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 
5-yr Pub 
Avg. 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.09 
Associate 
Prof. 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.08 
Full Prof. 0.03 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.10 -0.08 -0.07 0.15 
Uni. 
Reputation 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.68 
Female -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.02 
1st Grant 
Prob. -0.06 0.06 0.28 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.11 
# Stu 
Funded 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Chemistry 0.02 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 
Computer 
Science 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.06 0.07 -0.06 
Earth & 
Atmosph 0.02 0.09 0.11 -0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 0.11 
Electrial 
Eng. 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.00 
Physics -0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
South 
Asian 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
Other 
Asian 0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 
African 
Amer. 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 
Hispanic 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.06 
Native 
American 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 









         














Prof. Full Prof. 
Uni. 
Reputation Female 
Admin. Str. 1        
# Courses  -0.06 1       
# 
Committee
s 0.33 0.10 1      
5-yr Pub 
Avg. 0.02 -0.09 0.09 1     
Associate 
Prof. 0.00 0.15 0.02 -0.03 1    
Full Prof. 0.16 -0.06 0.24 0.17 -0.56 1   
Uni. 
Reputation -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 0.06 -0.09 0.10 1  
Female 0.04 -0.07 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 1 
1st Grant 
Prob. 0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.07 -0.07 0.12 0.09 -0.04 
# Stu 
Funded 0.12 -0.12 0.11 0.26 -0.04 0.18 0.05 0.00 
Chemistry 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.11 0.01 
Computer 
Science -0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.14 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Earth & 
Atmosph 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.08 -0.02 0.04 0.07 0.03 
Electrial 
Eng. -0.09 0.10 -0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.03 0.00 
Physics 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.18 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
South 
Asian -0.09 0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 
Other 
Asian -0.08 -0.04 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.03 0.01 
African 
Amer. 0.04 0.07 -0.01 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.03 
Hispanic 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.01 
Native 
American 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 















Eng. Physics South Asian 
1st Grant 
Prob. 1        
# Stu 
Funded 0.03 1       
Chemistry -0.06 0.17 1      
Computer 
Science -0.03 0.04 -0.21 1     
Earth & 
Atmosph 0.11 -0.18 -0.23 -0.21 1    
Electrial 
Eng. -0.05 0.12 -0.20 -0.18 -0.21 1   
Physics 0.14 -0.03 -0.21 -0.19 -0.21 -0.18 1  
South 
Asian -0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.06 -0.10 0.12 0.04 1 
Other 
Asian 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.10 0.00 -0.08 
African 
Amer. 0.01 -0.06 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Hispanic 0.06 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04 
Native 
American -0.05 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
Race Other 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.03 
 







American Race Other 
Other Asian 1     
African Amer. 0.02 1    
Hispanic -0.06 -0.02 1   
Native American 0.02 0.10 -0.01 1  
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APPENDIX B  
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Table B1: Correlations 
 Admin Stress Cler. Int. Exec. Int. Dept. Chair Dean Cent. Dir. Assist. Prof. Assoc. Prof. 
Admin Stress 1        
Clerical Intensity 0.04 1       
Executive Intensity 0.01 0.14 1      
Dept. Chair 0.22 -0.01 0.00 1     
Dean 0.09 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 1    
Center Director 0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 1   
Assist. Prof. -0.18 0.02 -0.03 -0.12 -0.05 -0.13 1  
Assoc. Prof. 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.37 1 
Undergrad FTE -0.08 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.03 
Grad. FTE -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
Total Workers -0.02 -0.23 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.08 
Female 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 
South Asisan -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.02 
Other Asian -0.07 0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.12 -0.02 
Black 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 
Hispanic 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 
Nat. American -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 
Other Race -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04 
Private Control 0.08 -0.06 -0.19 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.11 
Chemistry 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 0.02 0.00 
Computer Science -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Electrical Engin. -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 
Physics 0.03 -0.01 0.06 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
 
 Ugrad FTE Grad. FTE Ttl Wrkrs Female South Asisan Other Asian Black Hispanic 
Undergrad FTE 1        
Grad. FTE 0.49 1       
Total Workers 0.54 0.73 1      
Female -0.02 -0.01 0.00 1     
South Asisan 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.03 1    
Other Asian 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.07 1   
Black -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.04 -0.03 0.01 1  
Hispanic 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 1 
Nat. American -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.01 
Other Race -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 
Private Control -0.55 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.03 
Chemistry -0.06 -0.05 -0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Computer Science -0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 -0.01 
Electrical Engin. 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.01 




 Nat. Amer. Other Race Private Chem Comp Sci E & A EE Phys 
Nat. American 1        
Other Race -0.01 1       
Private Control 0.01 0.03 1      
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Chemistry 0.04 -0.03 0.02 1     
Computer Science 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.21 1    
Earth & Atmosphere 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.22 -0.21 1   
Electrical Engin. -0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 1  
Physics -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.21 -0.20 -0.21 -0.18 1 
 
 
Figure B1: Histogram of Stress from Administrative Responsibilities 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is relatively normal, with slight skew to right, making it 
fit with the assumptions of statistical theory.   
 
Table B2: Alternative Models Predicting Stress from Administrative 
Responsibilities 
 M4a M4b 
VARIABLES OLS Multi-Level 
   
Staff Intensity 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Executive Intensity 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Department Chair 0.95*** 0.95*** 



















0 1 2 3
admin_stress
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Dean 0.86*** 0.86*** 
 (0.14) (0.24) 
Center Director 0.31*** 0.34*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Assistant Prof. -0.28*** -0.28*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Associate Prof. -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Log Undergrad FTE -0.07* -0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Log Graduate FTE -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
Log Total Workers 0.06 0.05 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Female 0.06 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
South Asian -0.16* -0.16* 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Other Asian -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Black 0.35* 0.36* 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
Hispanic 0.23* 0.23* 
 (0.13) (0.13) 
Native American -0.47 -0.47 
 (0.33) (0.31) 
Other Race -0.06 -0.06 
 (0.16) (0.16) 
Private Control (vs. Public) 0.12** 0.12** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Chemistry 0.08 0.08 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Computer Science -0.11 -0.11 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Earth & Atmosphere 0.03 0.03 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Electrical Engineering -0.17** -0.17** 
 (0.05) (0.08) 
Physics 0.05 0.05 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant 1.93*** 1.93*** 
 (0.35) (0.35) 
   
Observations 1,558 1,558 
R-squared 0.12  
  150 
Number of groups  148 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Biology is the base field. Caucasian is the base 




Model 4 (Ordered Logit):  
 Post-estimation test of Model 4 reveal the difference between the coefficients for 
staff and executive intensity are statistically different at the p<0.05 level. 
o Chi Squared = 5.14 (p=0.02) 
 
Model 4a (OLS):  
 Post-estimation test of Model 4a reveal the difference between the coefficients for 
staff and executive intensity are statistically different at the p<0.05 level. 
o Chi Squared = 5.48 (p=0.02) 
 
Model 4b (Multilevel):  
 Post-estimation test of Model 4a reveal the difference between the coefficients for 
staff and executive intensity are statistically different at the p<0.05 level. 
o Chi Squared = 5.50 (p=0.02) 
 Likelihood-ratio tests of Model 4a and 4b reveal the OLS model to be a better fit 
to the data than a multi-level model.  




Table B3: Multicollinearity of Model 4a 
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Total Workers 2.86 0.35 
Grad FTE 2.48 0.40 
Undergrad FTE 2.36 0.42 
Earth & Atmosphere 1.71 0.59 
Private Control 1.70 0.59 
Chemistry 1.69 0.59 
Computer Science 1.68 0.60 
Physics 1.67 0.60 
Electrical Engineering 1.59 0.63 
Assistant Professor 1.27 0.79 
Associate Professor 1.25 0.80 
Staff Intensity 1.16 0.86 
Executive Intensity 1.08 0.92 
Other Asian 1.05 0.95 
South Asian 1.05 0.95 
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Center Director 1.05 0.96 
Department Chair 1.04 0.96 
Black 1.02 0.98 
Native American 1.02 0.98 
Dean 1.02 0.98 
Hispanic 1.02 0.98 
Other Race 1.02 0.98 
Female 1.01 0.99 
 
 
Factor analysis of the job stressors 
 










Administrative Responsibilities 0.24 0.32 -0.01 0.84 
Relationships with Colleagues 0.23 0.26 0.04 0.88 
Publishing Demands 0.65 -0.12 0.02 0.56 
Teaching Responsibilities 0.55 0.00 -0.03 0.69 
Time Allocation Between Work and Family 0.54 0.05 -0.03 0.70 
Demands for Obtaining External Research 
Funding 
0.50 -0.17 0.03 0.72 
 
 Number of items in the scale:            6 
 Scale reliability coefficient:      0.6136 
 
Multilevel Modeling 
The multi-level model building process began with an unconditional model for 
the dependent variable from which variance estimates yielded an intraclass correlation of 
.01, signifying that university level differences accounted for 1% of the variation in 
faculty stress from administrative responsibilities. This number indicates very low 
variation in stress across universities making the dependent variable not particularly 
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Number of groups 149 
  
Level 1 Variance 0.10 
 






Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Intra-class Correlation Calculation 
. 102
. 102 + . 852
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Time Satis. 1        
Global Satis. 0.48 1       
Role Clarity 0.30 0.40 1      
Inst. Support 0.53 0.51 0.3646 1     
Cleric. Satis. 0.41 0.43 0.32 0.44 1    
Admin. Appoint. 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.03 1   
Num. Comm. Sat. 0.56 0.34 0.22 0.44 0.28 -0.02 1  
Assist. Prof. -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.21 0.05 1 
Assoc. Prof. -0.15 -0.09 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 0.01 -0.11 -0.36 
Full Prof.  0.16 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.07 -0.42 
Salary 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.21 0.09 -0.38 
Num Courses. Sat 0.47 0.36 0.19 0.33 0.29 0.06 0.29 -0.03 
Ext. Fund. Exp. Sat. 0.37 0.37 0.24 0.35 0.44 0.02 0.27 0.00 
Nat. American -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.01 
Asian 0.05 -0.04 0.02 0.08 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.06 
Black -0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 
Hispanic 0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
White -0.03 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 
Other Race -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Multiracial -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Age 0.16 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.09 -0.50 
Enrollment 0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 
Private Control 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 
Female -0.13 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 0.09 
Married 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.06 
WL Balance 0.61 0.40 0.25 0.54 0.34 -0.04 0.46 -0.01 












American Asian Black 
Assoc. Prof. 1        
Full Prof.  -0.69 1       
Salary -0.31 0.60 1      
Num Courses. Sat -0.08 0.10 0.13 1     
Ext. Fund. Exp. Sat. -0.10 0.10 0.15 0.28 1    
Nat. American -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 1   
Asian 0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 1  
Black -0.05 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.05 -0.16 -0.60 1 
Hispanic 0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.47 
White 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.40 
Other Race -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.17 
Multiracial 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.25 
Age -0.17 0.55 0.39 0.08 -0.03 0.02 -0.11 0.10 
Enrollment 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.09 -0.04 0.00 0.02 0.03 
Private Control -0.03 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 
Female 0.10 -0.16 -0.20 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 
Married 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.01 
WL Balance -0.17 0.17 0.18 0.38 0.35 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 
Inst.  Supp. Sat. -0.06 0.02 0.07 0.31 0.49 0.00 -0.02 0.05 









Hispanic 1        
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White -0.04 1       
Other Race -0.02 -0.02 1      
Multiracial -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1     
Age 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.04 1    
Enrollment -0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 1   
Private Control -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.50 1  
Female 0.07 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.00 1 
Married 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.07 
WL Balance -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.02 0.02 -0.18 







Married 1   
WL Balance -0.01 1  
Inst.  Supp. Sat. -0.03 0.33 1 
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Factor Loadings  
Table C2: Global Job Satisfaction Factor Loadings 
Variable Factor Loading Uniqueness 
Department Satisfaction 0.70 0.52 
Institution Satisfaction 0.70 0.52 
 
 
Table C3: Satisfaction with Time Allocations Factor Loadings 






Teaching Time Satisfaction 0.55 0.17 0.67 
Research Time Satisfaction 0.59 0.14 0.63 
Service Time Satisfaction 0.71 -0.12 0.49 
Outreach Time Satisfaction 0.54 0.01 0.71 
Administrative Tasks 
Satisfaction 
0.62 -0.17 0.59 
 
 
Table C4: Clerical Satisfaction Factor Loadings 
Variable Factor Loadings Uniqueness 
Grant Support Pre-award Satisfaction 0.71 0.5 
Grant Support Post-award Satisfaction 0.74 0.45 




  157 
Model Equation  
 
The final multi-level models (Tables 8 and 9) took the following form with ‘i’ 
indicating individual level, and ‘j’ indicating university level, 𝑢0𝑗  representing university 
error and  𝜀𝑖𝑗 respresenting individual error: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑗
=  𝛾0 + 𝛾1(𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗) +  𝛾2(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗)  




Unconditional Models and Intra-class Correlation Calculations 
 







Number of groups 56 
  
Level 1 Variance 0.19 
 






Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 




Intra-class Correlation Calculation 
. 192
. 192 + . 762
=  .06 
  158 







Number of groups 56 
  
Level 1 Variance 0.14 
 






Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 




Intra-class Correlation Calculation 
. 142
. 142 + . 852
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OLS Linear Regressions and Likelihood Ratio Tests Comparing with Multilevel 
Models 
Table C7: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Predicting Global Job Satisfaction 
Variable (7) (8) (9) 
    
Role Clarity for Faculty and Administrators 0.28*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Institutional Support for Faculty Leaders  0.25*** 0.13*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Administrative Leadership Appointments   0.13*** 
   (0.02) 
Number of Committees Satisfaction   0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Assistant Professor   0.00 
   (0.03) 
Associate Professor   -0.02 
   (0.02) 
Salary   0.00 
   (0.01) 
Clerical Satisfaction   0.10*** 
   (0.01) 
Number of Courses Taught Satisfaction   0.09*** 
   (0.01) 
Ext. Funding Expectations Satisfaction   0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Age   0.00 
   (0.00) 
Enrollment   -0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Private Control (vs. Public)   0.07*** 
   (0.03) 
Female   0.02 
   (0.02) 
Marital Status   -0.00 
   (0.01) 
Time Balance Ability   0.05*** 
   (0.01) 
Institutional Grant Support Satisfaction   0.08*** 
   (0.01) 
Native American   -0.10 
   (0.11) 
Asian   -0.18*** 
   (0.03) 
Black   -0.08** 
   (0.04) 
Hispanic   -0.07 
   (0.05) 
Other Race   -0.16 
   (0.11) 
Multiracial   0.01 
   (0.07) 
Constant -0.84*** -1.20*** -1.68*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Observations 6,036 6,036 5,590 
R-squared 0.17 0.32 0.42 
Notes: Base case for faculty rank is full professor, and for race is White. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Likelihood ratio test comparing fits of model 3 and model 9: Chi-Squared 
= 53.10; P-value  = 0.00. 
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Table C8: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Predicting Satisfaction with Time 
Allocations 
Variable (10) (11) (12) 
    
Role Clarity for Faculty and Administrators 0.23*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Institutional Support for Faculty Leaders  0.31*** 0.07*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
Administrative Leadership Appointments   0.02 
   (0.02) 
Number of Committees Satisfaction   0.23*** 
   (0.01) 
Assistant Professor   0.05* 
   (0.03) 
Associate Professor   -0.01 
   (0.02) 
Salary   0.01* 
   (0.01) 
Clerical Satisfaction   0.08*** 
   (0.01) 
Number of Courses Taught Satisfaction   0.14*** 
   (0.01) 
Ext. Funding Expectations Satisfaction   0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Age   0.01*** 
   (0.00) 
Enrollment   -0.02* 
   (0.01) 
Private Control (vs. Public)   -0.08*** 
   (0.02) 
Female   -0.02 
   (0.02) 
Marital Status   0.01 
   (0.01) 
Time Balance Ability   0.19*** 
   (0.01) 
Institutional Grant Support Satisfaction   0.04*** 
   (0.01) 
Native American   0.03 
   (0.12) 
Asian   0.04 
   (0.03) 
Black   0.13*** 
   (0.04) 
Hispanic   0.01 
   (0.04) 
Other Race   -0.05 
   (0.12) 
Multiracial   -0.02 
   (0.07) 
Constant -0.69*** -1.14*** -2.78*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) 
Observations 6,159 6,159 5,702 
R-squared 0.09 0.29 0.56 
Notes: Base case for faculty rank is full professor, and for race is White. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Likelihood ratio test comparing fits of model 6 and model 12: Chi-
Squared = 5.01; P-value  = 0.01 
 
 
  161 
Tests for Multi-collinearity 
 
Table C9: Multicollinearity Results from Model 9 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
Assistant Prof. 2.49 0.40 
Associate Prof. 1.90 0.53 
Annual Salary 1.86 0.54 
Institutional Support 1.83 0.55 
Age 1.76 0.57 
Work Balance 1.73 0.58 
Institutional Support Sat. 1.72 0.58 
Clerical Satisfaction 1.62 0.62 
Ext. Fund. Exp. Sat. 1.51 0.66 
Private Control 1.46 0.69 
Enrollment 1.46 0.69 
# Committee Satisfaction 1.41 0.71 
# Courses Satisfaction 1.29 0.78 
Role Clarity Rules 1.23 0.81 
Administrative Position 1.10 0.91 
Gender 1.09 0.92 
Asian 1.06 0.95 
Black 1.05 0.96 
Marital Status 1.03 0.98 
Hispanic 1.02 0.98 
Multiracial 1.01 0.99 
Other Race 1.01 0.99 
Native American 1.00 1.00 
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Table C10: Multicollinearity Results from Model 12 
Variable VIF 1/VIF   
Assistant Prof. 2.47 0.41 
Associate Prof. 1.90 0.53 
Annual Salary 1.86 0.54 
Institutional Support 1.83 0.55 
Age 1.75 0.57 
Work Balance 1.73 0.58 
Institutional Support Sat. 1.72 0.58 
Clerical Satisfaction 1.62 0.62 
Ext. Fund. Exp. Sat. 1.51 0.66 
Private Control 1.46 0.69 
Enrollment 1.46 0.69 
# Committee Satisfaction 1.41 0.71 
# Courses Satisfaction 1.29 0.77 
Role Clarity Rules 1.23 0.81 
Administrative Position 1.10 0.91 
Gender 1.09 0.92 
Asian 1.06 0.95 
Black 1.05 0.96 
Marital Status 1.02 0.98 
Hispanic 1.02 0.98 
Multiracial 1.01 0.99 
Other Race 1.01 0.99 
Native American 1.01 0.99 
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Table C11: Harman Single Factor Test for All Variables 
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 
Satisfaction with Time Allocations 0.75 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.01 -0.01 
Global Satisfaction 0.65 0.14 -0.10 0.05 0.06 0.03 
Role Clarity Rules 0.42 0.18 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.01 
Institutional Support 0.68 0.22 -0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.02 
Clerical Satisfaction 0.60 0.17 -0.08 0.06 0.01 0.01 
Administrative Position 0.09 -0.16 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.01 
# Committees Satisfaction 0.55 0.14 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 
Assistant Professor -0.07 0.60 -0.09 -0.78 0.03 0.00 
Associate Professor -0.31 0.37 -0.29 0.82 -0.07 0.00 
Full Professor 0.36 -0.83 0.35 -0.19 0.05 0.00 
Salary 0.33 -0.53 0.22 0.05 -0.06 0.01 
# Courses Satisfaction 0.51 0.05 -0.06 0.06 0.02 0.01 
Ext. Funding Satisfaction 0.55 0.11 -0.08 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Native American -0.04 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.02 
Asian 0.03 0.29 0.56 0.04 -0.69 -0.30 
White 0.08 -0.46 -0.87 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 
Black -0.05 0.27 0.36 0.10 0.72 -0.42 
Hispanic -0.08 0.17 0.33 0.05 0.07 0.86 
Other Race -0.05 -0.02 0.21 0.01 0.03 -0.02 
Multiracial -0.05 0.10 0.20 0.04 0.16 0.16 
Age 0.20 -0.55 0.17 0.19 0.09 -0.02 
Enrollment 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.05 -0.14 0.01 
Private Control 0.10 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.05 
Gender -0.18 0.12 -0.07 0.00 0.09 0.00 
Marital Status -0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.02 
Work Balance 0.68 0.09 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.00 
Institutional Support Satisfaction 0.59 0.20 -0.13 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 
 
 
 
  
